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THINKING LIKE A LAWYER ABOUT LEGISLATION: 
IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATIVE DECISION THEORY 




Hugh L. Brady* 
 
 
The Texas Supreme Court in the late 1990s, in two significant cases, 
arguably interpreted statutes to achieve a result directly opposite to the Texas 
Legislature’s decision to adopt a specific text.  Why do lawyers and judges struggle 
when reading and applying legislation, especially when using enactment history?  
Under Professor Victoria Nourse’s legislative decision theory, the struggle is 
attributable to the fact that lawyers do not consider the legislature’s institutional 
rules and procedures to find the proper text to interpret a statute in light of the 
available legislative evidence.  Wider implementation of her theory is hampered by 
current legal citation practices that mistreat legislative evidence and legislation itself 
and inhibit legal reasoning when using these authorities.  The Bluebook and other 
citation manuals are designed primarily to enable sophisticated reasoning with case 
law.  This bias is demonstrated by the ways in which the Bluebook has radically 
altered how lawyers and judges think about federal law with little notice.  Legislative 
decision theory shows how accepted legislative procedures indicate the Texas 
Supreme Court reached the opposite result decided by the Legislature in each case.  
Because current legal citation practice did not provide a method for citing the proper 
legislative action, the court was unable to read the pertinent statutes in light of the 
relevant legislative evidence.  Using Texas as a case study, a detailed review of the 
legislative process and the legislative evidence it produces demonstrates the need for 
comprehensive and workable citation practices for legislation.  These goals are best 
achieved by individual states’ issuance of a specialized citation manual, such as a 
proposed Orangebook for Texas, to prevent recurring, substantial errors made by 
lawyers and courts in interpreting statutes. 
 
 
* Senior Lecturer in Law, The University of Texas School of Law; Parliamentarian, Texas House of 
Representatives.  The views presented in this Article are solely mine and do not represent the views of the Texas 
House of Representatives.  
I wish to thank Bryan A. Garner, James Hambleton, Tobias A. Dorsey, and Judge Amy Clark Meachum 
(among others), for their keen review of, and comments on, prior drafts. 
  
 Journal of Legislation                  40 
 
Contents 
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 41 
I. BETTER THINKING ABOUT LEGISLATION—AND WHY WE HAVEN’T BEEN 
DOING IT ALREADY ............................................................................................ 45 
A. BETTER THINKING ABOUT LEGISLATION: LEGISLATIVE DECISION 
THEORY ........................................................................................................... 45 
B. WHY WE HAVEN’T BEEN DOING IT ALREADY: LEGAL CITATION AS AN 
OBSTACLE TO WIDER IMPLEMENTATION OF LEGISLATIVE DECISION THEORY .     
……………………………………………………………………………….51 
1. Legal Citation as Legal Thought ........................................................ 53 
2. Legal Citation is Designed for Common-Law Thought ...................... 55 
3. How Legal Citation Has Hindered Thinking About Legislation ........ 58 
II. IMPROVING CITATION OF LEGISLATION ..................................................... 59 
A. APPLYING LEGISLATIVE DECISION THEORY TO JONES AND FLEMING 
FOODS ............................................................................................................. 59 
B. HOW LEGAL CITATION MISTREATS LEGISLATIVE EVIDENCE: A STATE-
SPECIFIC CASE STUDY .................................................................................... 62 
1. Bills ..................................................................................................... 63 
2. Resolutions .......................................................................................... 66 
3. Amendments ........................................................................................ 67 
4. Procedural History and Explanatory Notations ................................. 68 
III. THE WAY FORWARD: CITATION MANUALS FOR LEGISLATION ............. 70 
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................... 72 
APPENDIX A: TOPIC OUTLINE FOR LEGISLATIVE CITATION MANUALS ............ 73 












In a pair of cases in the late 1990s, the Supreme Court of Texas considered a 
somewhat obscure, yet important question: What should courts do when the 
legislature enacts a non-substantive codification of the laws on a given subject, yet 
the “clear, unambiguous statutes that were drafted . . . as part of the codification 
process” make a “substantive departure from [the] prior law[?]”2  Should the courts 
disregard the mistake made during the codification process and apply the prior law 
and its interpretation?3  Or should the courts apply the current law on its terms to 
effect the substantive change?4 
In both cases, the codifications were characterized as non-substantive 
revisions of the law that were not intended by the Texas Legislature5 to “alter the 
sense, meaning, or effect of the statute.”6  The first case, Jones v. Fowler, was an 
action under the Texas Family Code in which two same-sex partners were fighting 
over visitation rights to a child the couple raised together for about three years from 
the child’s birth.7  The second case, Fleming Foods of Texas, Inc. v. Rylander, was 
an action brought under the Texas Tax Code by a corporation seeking a refund of 
sales taxes it paid through a third party without first obtaining a statutorily required 
assignment of the refund right.8 
In answering the questions posed at the beginning of this Article, the court 
gave two different answers based on its independent determination of whether the 
codifications’ changes in restating the law were, in fact, non-substantive.  In Jones, it 
held that the Family Code codification’s change was non-substantive and denied 
visitation rights to the plaintiff.9  In Fleming Foods, it held that the Tax Code 
codification’s change was substantive and permitted the corporation to obtain a tax 
refund of at least $350,000.10 
In both cases, the court’s use of statutory enactment history was criticized.  
In Jones, “the court’s rationale for considering legislative intent lack[ed] something 
 
1 Citations in footnotes are generally prepared according to THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF 
CITATION (Columbia L. Rev. Ass’n et al. eds., 20th ed. 2015) [hereinafter BLUEBOOK 20th ed.].  Citations to 
Texas-specific sources, other than the suggested forms in Part II, are generally prepared according to TEXAS 
RULES OF FORM: THE GREENBOOK (Texas L. Rev. ed., 14th ed. 2018) [hereinafter GREENBOOK 14th ed.].  For 
prior editions, these short forms are used after a full reference, e.g., GREENBOOK 13th ed.  I use “the Bluebook” 
and “the Greenbook” for simplicity’s sake.  Finally, I use only the archive URL for Internet sources to spare 
future readers from frustration associated with clicking dead links.  See Henry A. Feild, James Allan & Rosie 
Jones, Predicting Searcher Frustration, Address Before the 33rd Annual International ACM SIGIR Conference 
(July 2010), in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 33RD ANNUAL INTERNATIONAL ACM SIGIR CONFERENCE, 2010, at 34, 
37. 
2 Fleming Foods of Tex., Inc. v. Rylander, 6 S.W.3d 278, 283 (Tex. 1999). 
3 See Stephanie M. Dooley, The Select Committee on Judicial Interpretations, 14 APP. ADVOC. 7 (2001). 
4 See Ron Beal, The Art of Statutory Construction: Texas Style, 64 BAYLOR L. REV. 339, 357–58 (2012). 
5 The Texas Legislature will be referred to as “the Legislature” throughout this article. 
6 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 323.007(b) (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2019 Regular Session of 
the 86th Legislature). 
7 Jones v. Fowler, 969 S.W.2d 429, 430 (Tex. 1998). 
8 Fleming Foods, 6 S.W.3d at 279. 
9 Jones, 969 S.W.2d at 433. 
10 Fleming Foods, 6 S.W.3d at 286. 
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in lucidity.”11  In response to Fleming Foods, the Speaker of the Texas House of 
Representatives created a select committee for reviewing appellate decisions “to 
identify those decisions that . . . clearly failed to properly implement legislative 
purposes.”12 
Lawyers13 are uncomfortable with the statute book.14  We struggle with 
legislation,15 as in Jones and Fleming Foods, because we do not understand the 
legislative process that produces it.16  This may be surprising as we live in an age of 
statutes, where legislation shapes and controls wide swaths, if not the near-entirety, 
of modern law.17  In such an age, “competent lawyers must understand not just what 
the law is but also how law gets made.”18 
One good reason for our inexpert use of statutes is that legal education does 
not prepare us to think about legislation in the same way it prepares us to think about 
the common law because it does not provide us the necessary “general skills of 
dealing with legislatures and their statutory products”19 in the same manner as case 
 
11 James W. Paulsen, Family Law: Parent and Child, 52 SMU L. REV. 1197, 1203 (1999).  Professor 
Paulsen thought Jones was “probably legally correct.”  Id.  This was in part because it “relied on clear legislative 
history that no substantive change was intended.”  Id. at 1202.  As we shall see in Part II, the enactment history 
supports the opposite conclusion concerning whether the Legislature decided that it was making some 
substantive change in the Family Code codification. 
12 TEX. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SELECT COMM. ON JUD. INTERPRETATIONS OF L., INTERIM REPORT 
TO THE 77TH TEXAS LEGISLATURE ii (2000). 
13 For readability, I use the term “lawyers” to include judges when discussing the legal profession. 
14 Tobias A. Dorsey, Some Reflections on Yates and the Statutes We Threw Away, 18 GREEN BAG 2D 377, 
377–78 (2015). 
15 Strictly speaking, “legislation” means only the basic sources of written, positive law adopted through a 
formal process focused on production of a final text that is governed by both political and legal norms, including 
final approval by representative actors.  See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation, 54 MD. L. REV. 
633, 659–60, 661–65 (1995); Legislation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  However, “[l]egislation 
is mostly about process[:] . . . the process through which courts and administrative agencies interpret statutes . . 
. [and] the process through which statutes are enacted into law.”  Dakota S. Rudesill, Christopher J. Walker & 
Daniel P. Tokaji, A Program in Legislation, 65 J. LEG. EDUC. 70, 79 (2015).  Thus, I use the term to refer to 
both statutes and the materials associated with the process that evidence the final text’s enactment. 
16 See infra Part I.A.  
17 GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1 (1982) (describing the “fundamental 
change in American law” during the twentieth century from “a legal system dominated by the common law, 
divined by courts, to one in which statutes, enacted by legislatures, have become the primary source of law”); 
Elizabeth Garrett, Teaching Law and Politics, 7 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 11, 14 (2003) (“We live in an 
age of statutes . . . .”). 
18 Rudesill, Walker & Tokaji, supra note 15, at 79. 
19 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Legislation Scholarship and Pedagogy in the Post-Legal 
Process Era, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 691, 691 (1987); see also Robert F. Williams, Statutory Law in Legal 
Education: Still Second Class After All These Years, 35 MERCER L. REV. 803, 832–38 (1984).  In 2015, just five 
of the top ninety-nine law schools (as ranked in 2014 by U.S. News and World Report) required students to take 
a legislation course as part of their graduation requirements.  Abbe R. Gluck, The Ripple Effect of “Leg-Reg” 
on the Study of Legislation & Administrative Law in the Law School Classroom, 65 J. LEG. EDUC. 121, 124, 
126–27 (2015).  Seventeen required students to complete a “legislation-regulation” course as part of their 
graduation requirements.  Id. at 127–28.  These courses treat “legislation” as statutory interpretation from the 
judicial perspective and have a strong administrative law component.  See id. at 156–57 (noting, in discussing 
the content of “leg-reg” syllabi, that “the legislation topics covered are fairly constant[:] the main canons of 
construction, legislative history, and the central theories of interpretation. . . . [A] number of upper-level 
legislation courses at schools without required courses do cover a range of more advanced topics, including 
complexities of the legislative process. . . . These generally do not appear in the leg-reg syllabi . . . .”).  
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law.  Legal theories of statutory interpretation view the legislative process with a 
jaundiced eye.20  Professor Victoria Nourse’s legislative decision theory has recently 
emerged to challenge this stance with its insistence that statutory interpretation must 
consider the legislature’s institutional rules and procedures to find the proper text to 
interpret in light of the available legislative evidence.21  However, wider use of 
legislative decision theory is hindered by our lack of ability to deftly use the evidence 
of a statute’s enactment to construct and support legal arguments for the conclusive 
reading of a statutory text.22  We lack this skill in part because legal citation does not 
provide us the same tools to expertly describe the authoritative nature of legislation 
as it does for cases. 
We build our legal arguments using “the language of authority,” which 
includes the “conventions of legal citation.”23  Citation to authority, whether cases or 
statutes, is a fundamental component of common-law systems and their methods of 
reasoning.24  However, “[l]egal sophisticates these days worry little about the ins and 
outs of citation, tending instead to cast their lot with the legal realists in believing that 
the citation of legal authorities . . . is scarcely more than a decoration.”25  This view 
overlooks “the point that citation practice is intimately connected with the 
authoritative core of the idea of law.”26  Legal citation is indispensable to legal 
argument because it is the method we use to “characterize and use law” and forms 
“the basis of virtually all legal conversation in a common law system.”27  Reflecting 
the case-centric nature of the common-law system,28 the Bluebook—and by 
extension, legal citation—does not treat legislation with the same care as it does cases.  
This hinders us from appropriately characterizing and using legislation.29 
That legal citation is partly responsible for our inexpert use of legislation 
seems surprising only to those who view it as a matter of style.  But it is precisely 
because the “rules of citation are . . . guides to argumentation . . . and the form of 
citation conveys (or argues for) the strength of an authority” that legal citation of 
legislation deserves critical examination and “substantive analysis of the ways that 
lawyers use authority.”30 
In Part I, I outline Nourse’s legislative decision theory and its insistence that, 
unlike the other major theories, statutory interpretation must consider the legislature’s 
 
20 See infra Part I.A.  
21 See generally VICTORIA NOURSE, MISREADING LAW, MISREADING DEMOCRACY (2016) [hereinafter 
NOURSE, MISREADING LAW]. 
22 See Kris Franklin, “. . . See Erie.”: Critical Study of Legal Authority, 31 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 
109, 111 (2008). 
23 FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: A NEW INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 66–
67, 73 (2009) [hereinafter SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER]. 
24 Byron D. Cooper, Anglo-American Legal Citation: Historical Development and Library Implications, 
75 L. LIBR. J. 3, 7, 9–17 (1982); Peter M. Tiersma, The Textualization of Precedent, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1187, 1193–96 (2007). 
25 Frederick Schauer, Authority and Authorities, 94 VA. L. REV. 1931, 1932 (2008). 
26 Id. at 1934–35. 
27 Franklin, supra note 22, at 111. 
28 See infra Part I.B. 
29 This is true regardless of the theory of statutory interpretation one subscribes to. 
30 Franklin, supra note 22, at 111–12. 
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institutional rules and procedures to find the proper text to interpret in light of the 
available legislative evidence that provides necessary context to understand what the 
legislature decided.  I then investigate how current legal citation presents an obstacle 
to the wider implementation of Nourse’s theory because it reinforces common-law 
patterns.  This view is supported by the history of the Bluebook’s development as a 
manual of common-law thought and how it has, without notice or uproar, significantly 
and detrimentally altered the way lawyers think about federal statute law. 
I return back to Jones and Fleming Foods in Part II and apply legislative 
decision theory to show how accepted legislative procedures indicate the Supreme 
Court of Texas reached the opposite result decided by the Texas Legislature in each 
case.  I also show that the court was unable to read the codification bills in light of 
the relevant legislative context because Texas legal citation practice did not provide 
a method for citing the proper legislative action.  Using the Texas Legislature as a 
case study, I then evaluate how Texas legal citation practice mishandles Texas 
legislation in order to outline areas for improvement. 
In Part III, I discuss the need for sustained effort to develop robust citation 
practices for legislation that will support its more expert use by lawyers and sketch 
the broad outlines of, and goals to be achieved by, specialized citation manuals for 
legislation.  Lawyers have difficulty when dealing with legislation because citation 
practices for legislative authorities are woefully undeveloped and inadequate.  
Developing legal citation rules to address the special problems presented by 
legislation should help improve the interpretation and application of statutes by aiding 
their sophisticated reasoning by lawyers.  Finally, two appendixes outline topics to be 
included in a citation manual for legislation.  The appendixes also set out a citation 
rule for bills, providing an example of legal citation practices for bills that permit 
expert implementation of legislative decision theory. 
This Article makes small, but meaningful, contributions to the ongoing 
debates over statutory interpretation.  Its examination of Jones and Fleming Foods 
provides additional, compelling proof of Nourse’s legislative decision theory.31  Just 
as importantly, it does so in the context of the state legislative process, where it has 
been presumed that “a different approach to statutory interpretation is needed” in 
states where legislative evidence is scarce.32  This Article shows that legislative 
decision theory’s methodology overcomes this presumption and works both 
nationally and sub-nationally because it uses each legislature’s specific modes of 
procedure.33  This Article also illustrates how legal citation practice substantially 
 
31 See James E. Pfander, Statutory Interpretation for Courts and Lawyers, JOTWELL (Mar. 26, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/F5QQ-YBEB (reviewing NOURSE, MISREADING LAW, supra note 21). 
32 Richard A. Briffault, Beyond Congress: The Study of State and Local Legislatures, 7 N.Y.U.  J. LEGIS. 
& PUB. POL’Y 23, 24 (2003) (“[W]ith Congress, the fifty states, and thousands of county and municipal 
legislatures to consider, a comprehensive analysis is well beyond my individual capacity.”). 
33 For example, these additional proofs could provide grounds for reconsidering, in light of legislative 
decision theory’s ability to scale, the normative prescriptions of the “growing literature on whether lower federal 
courts and state courts should do statutory interpretation differently.”  Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Statutory 
Interpretation and the Rest of the Iceberg: Divergences Between the Lower Federal Courts and the Supreme 
Court, 68 DUKE L.J. 1, 7 (2018) (collecting articles that argue for, among other things, statutory interpretation 
approaches dependent on: a court’s institutional capacity; its place in the judicial hierarchy; whether its judges 
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mishandles legislation, evidences the need for better legal citation of legislation 
regardless of one’s theoretical approach to statutory interpretation, and proffers an 
approach to developing specialized citation manuals to meet this need. 
 
I.  BETTER THINKING ABOUT LEGISLATION—AND WHY WE HAVEN’T 
BEEN DOING IT ALREADY  
 
In this Part, I give a highly abbreviated account of the legislative decision 
theory advanced by Professor Victoria Nourse,34 including some obstacles to practical 
application of the legislative decision theory by lawyers.  Having considered how 
legal citation helps lawyers and judges think about case law, I also consider in this 
Part how legal citation does not help them think about legislation because legal 
citation as expressed by the common-law manuals does not require all significant 
information to provide the necessary contextual evidence of a statute’s enactment. 
 
A.  BETTER THINKING ABOUT LEGISLATION: LEGISLATIVE DECISION THEORY  
 
“[L]egislation is the primary instrument of ordered social change . . . .”35  
And, “[i]n ordinary usage and in the daily work of most lawyers, there is no 
question[:] Legislation is law . . . [and] it constitutes the bulk of the legal materials 
that ordinary people have to come to terms with.”36  Legislation must be discussed 
and considered in legislative chambers, executive offices, agency headquarters, and 
law offices.  Yet, even in the simplest of cases—those that do not present any 
particular tension between competing theories of statutory interpretation—lawyers 
commit basic errors when reading legislation.37  Why? 
The answer is that lawyers, by training, view the legislative process through 
a judicial lens.  This is attributable to the fact that “[m]ore than occasionally, law 
professors reveal a stunning lack of knowledge about [the] Congress’s rules.”38  This 
lack of knowledge “reflects the failure of the standard law school curriculum,” 39 most 
particularly its reliance on the case method, which teaches facility with judicial, rather 
 
are elected or appointed; and whether they possess general common-law powers not available to federal courts). 
34 Which, of course, does not accord it the full justice to which it is entitled. 
35 Joseph Dolan, Law School Teaching of Legislation—A Report to the Ford Foundation, 22 J. LEG. EDUC. 
63, 63 (1969). 
36 JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION 11 (1999). 
37 William  J. Aceves, Correcting an Evident Error: A Plea to Revise Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 107 GEO. 
L.J. ONLINE 63, 64–65, 70–77 (2018) (explaining how Justice Anthony Kennedy, in looking for “analogous 
statutes for guidance” when considering the scope of common-law actions, misread the significance of placing 
one congressional act as a statutory note to another, and thus “disregarded long-standing practice and black letter 
law that the placement of a statutory note . . . does not have any substantive impact on the law’s meaning, 
interpretation, or application” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
38 Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Legislative History by the Rules, 122 
YALE L.J. 70, 72 (2012) [hereinafter Nourse, Decision Theory]. 
39 Id. 
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than legislative, texts and thought.40  As Elizabeth Garrett explained: 
[B]ecause of the traditional first-year [law school] curriculum and the way 
we talk as lawyers, we think that what we’re doing is primarily common 
law.  That perception is simply wrong. . . . course[s] in regulatory and 
legislative processes explicitly reveal[] the dominance of statutes and 
regulations over common law.41 
Lawyers’ common-law bias is why, as Nourse explains, the main competing 
theories of statutory interpretation—textualism, purposivism, and positive political 
theory42—are not grounded in any positive view of the legislative process,43 including 
the legislature’s predetermined rules for making decisions to enact (or not enact) 
legislation.44 Coupled with their focus on the elusiveness of discerning legislative 
intent as a mental state revealed by legislative history, standard statutory 
interpretation theories seriously taint the work of lawyers seeking to implement 
statutory law and lead them to substantial error.45  
Common-law bias also explains why the main theories all “impose legalistic 
visions of how courts and judges operate onto a very different institution central to 
our democracy.”46  These visions are divorced from a realistic vision of legislatures47 
as institutions where members are subject to regular elections, which requires them 
to generally anticipate and vote for what their constituents want—what Nourse terms 
the “electoral connection.”48  Legislation must overcome significant procedural 
obstacles before it is presented to the executive for approval.  Among these obstacles 
in the Congress is the likelihood of a filibuster in the Senate.49  Ending a filibuster 
 
40 See id. at 72–75.  This is a long-standing complaint about legal education.  See Williams, supra note 19.  
This disconnect continues even as law schools add “legislation-regulation” courses to the mandatory first-year 
curriculum, which “follow the familiar, case-oriented approach—relying on appellate opinions and notes and 
comments on those opinions as the main course materials and the focus of the discussion.”  John F. Manning & 
Matthew Stephenson, Legislation & Regulation and Reform of the First Year, 65 J. LEG. EDUC. 45, 46 (2015). 
41 Garrett, supra note 17, at 14. 
42 In the sense of a contractarian theory of the legislative process rather than in the broad sense of the term.  
NOURSE, MISREADING LAW, supra note 21, at 199 n.3. 
43 Victoria F. Nourse, Elementary Statutory Interpretation: Rethinking Legislative Intent and History, 55 
B.C. L. REV. 1613, 1617 (2014) [hereinafter Nourse, Elementary Statutory Interpretation]. 
44 See generally NOURSE, MISREADING LAW, supra note 21. 
45 Nourse, Decision Theory, supra note 38, at 92–134. 
46 NOURSE, MISREADING LAW, supra note 21, at 62. 
47 I generalize Nourse’s description of the Congress to all legislatures generally.  Any incongruities are 
noted as necessary. 
48 NOURSE, MISREADING LAW, supra note 21, at 18–19. 
49 Id. at 27.  The filibuster is available in several state senates.  See, e.g., MEGHAN REILLY, OFF. LEGIS. 
RSCH., STATES LIMITING LEGISLATIVE DEBATE (2009), https://www.cga.ct.gov/2009/rpt/2009-R-0249.htm 
(compiling state legislative rules on debate limits).  Of the ten largest states, five senates do not impose 
meaningful limits on debate.  See id.; see also 2019 U.S. Population Estimates Continue to Show the Nation’s 
Growth Is Slowing, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 30, 2019), https://perma.cc/Y45T-3MDF (showing top ten 
states by population).  There may be other procedural constraints that create a supermajoritarian difficulty.  For 
example, the Texas Senate’s three-fifths “rule”—a practice supported by a combination of certain Senate rules 
read together with practical circumstances—requires the consent of a supermajority to take up any measure for 
consideration.  See STEVE BICKERSTAFF, LINES IN THE SAND: CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING IN TEXAS AND 
THE DOWNFALL OF TOM DELAY 115 (2007).  In use since Reconstruction, the three-fifths rule works as a 
reverse-filibuster: a senator can get a bill to the floor only by demonstrating extraordinary support for it.  See 
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requires sixty votes, meaning that a minority can (and often does) stall legislation.50  
This “supermajoritarian difficulty” means that “legislative action requires massive 
consensus.”51 
When legislating—“actively translat[ing] ideas into laws”—these members 
must speak to multiple audiences: first, the “people and [then] expert lawyers, judges, 
and administrators.”52  “Statutes . . . are exercises in communication along two 
conflicting dimensions—communication between [legislators] and citizens (the 
vertical dimension) and between legislatures and courts and agencies (the horizontal 
dimension).”53  This creates a “multiple audience” problem, as “the demands of a 
popular electoral audience” may, and likely do, compel the legislature to “ignore 
precision and the lawyerly voice.”54  Taken together, then, the electoral connection, 
the multiple audience problem, and the supermajoritarian difficulty create a strong 
structural preference for legislators relying on intentional ambiguity, redundant 
provisions, and vernacular language in order for legislation to pass.55  The result: 
“statutory language is often an amalgam of legal and popular meaning.”56 
Nourse skillfully takes on these three theories and shows how each fails to 
achieve its publicly articulated purpose.  All three theories fail to account for 
legislatures as institutions distinct from courts, with different values operating under 
different restraints.  Textualists are not very forgiving of legislatures, viewing them 
as undisciplined lawgivers more inclined to political bargaining and less inclined to 
principled lawgiving.  “If we take the textualists’ view of Congress-as-chaos to its 
extreme, then why should we look to text?  A truly chaotic Congress could not create 
plain meaning.”57  Purposivists are too forgiving of legislatures, viewing them as 
arenas where “reasonable persons pursu[e] reasonable purposes reasonably.”58  “But 
 
BILL HOBBY, HOW THINGS REALLY WORK: LESSONS FROM A LIFE IN POLITICS 133 (2010); see also John David 
Rausch, Jr., The Politics of Legislative Procedure, in WILLIAM EARL MAXWELL, ERNEST CRAIN & ADOLFO 
SANTOS, TEXAS POLITICS TODAY 209 (2011–2012 ed. 1978).  
50 See NOURSE, MISREADING LAW, supra note 21, at 27.  To be clear, Nourse also ascribes part of the 
supermajoritarian difficulty to the fact that each state is entitled to equal, rather than proportional, representation 
in the Senate, and thus small states can form a minority to block legislation.  Id. at 27–28.  Much of the 
filibustering activity in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries has been undertaken by the political 
minority in the Senate, which does not neatly overlap between large and small states, in an agenda-setting 
function.  See Gregory Koger, Filibustering and Partisanship in the Modern Senate, in PARTY AND PROCEDURE 
IN THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 217, 221–26 (Jacob R. Straus ed., 2012).  Even if one party represented most 
of the small states and another represented most of the large states, the same dynamic would still likely be present 
in the states in which senate districts may be gerrymandered to weigh rural interests over urban interests. 
51 NOURSE, MISREADING LAW, supra note 21, at 28. 
52 Id. at 20–21 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
53 Id. at 26. 
54 Id. at 25–27. 
55 Id.  
56 Id. at 26. 
57 Id. at 15.  Nourse engages in an extended critique of “petty textualism” and the use of statutory 
construction canons to show that textualism is “ideologically manipulable,” capable of producing counter-
intuitive results that expand, rather than restrict, the meaning of a text, and highly reflective of the textualist’s 
own individual bias; thus, Nourse shows textualism does not constrain judges from substituting their judgment 
for the legislature’s, but rather the opposite.  See id. at 44, 103–54. 
58 Id. at 47 (citing McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory 
Interpretation, GEO. L.J. 80, 705, 715 (1992)). 
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if [the] Congress reasons so well, every statute should be plainly reasonable, not 
ambiguous enough to send judges running to the statute’s history . . . .”59  Finally, 
positive political theorists vacillate between textualists and purposivists, with some 
viewing the Congress as an irrational “devil” and others viewing it as an efficient 
“angel.”60  Taken to “its logical extreme, then, [under this view,] interpretation would 
be least of our problems; government would be impossible or unnecessary.”61 
Nourse instead describes a distinct, straightforward approach to statutory 
interpretation by lawyers practicing in and before the political branches.  These 
lawyers read legislation against a background knowledge of the legislative process to 
answer the fundamental question: what did the legislature decide?62  Five principles 
form this background knowledge: 
 
1. Principle 1: “Statutes Are Elections”: There are winners and losers in the 
legislative process; because of this, “loser’s history”—statements and 
actions by legislators who did not vote for the bill’s passage—should not be 
used by the courts “for the authoritative meaning of a law.  The gold 
standard for legislative evidence is a core bipartisan agreement.”63 
2. Principle 2: “Statutes Follow a Sequence”: Statutory text is shaped by a 
sequential legislative process; “later text and legislative evidence may trump 
earlier legislative evidence” just as, for example, a Supreme Court decision 
will control over a trial court’s decision.64 
3.  Principle 3: “[Legislative] Rules Can Help Interpret Statutes”: Legislative 
procedure is designed to resolve conflicts over the final text between 
legislative coalitions.  These “rules . . . can provide interpretative guidance” 
much like the judicial canons of construction.65 
4. Principle 4: “Typologies of Legislative History May Mislead”: The first three 
principles—“conflict, sequence, and rules”—mean that there is not a 
hierarchy of legislative history in which one type, such as committee reports, 
are to be consistently valued over another type, such as floor statements.  
 
59 NOURSE, MISREADING LAW, supra note 21, at 15. 
60 Id. at 15. 
61 Id. 
62 Nourse, Elementary Statutory Interpretation, supra note 43, at 1614–20.  For a contrary view that expert 
knowledge of legislative procedure is superfluous to statutory interpretation, see generally Ryan D. Doerfler, 
Who Cares How Congress Really Works, 66 DUKE L.J. 979 (2017).  Doerfler does not completely engage with 
Nourse’s theory, her proofs, and her careful explanation of legislative evidence in context to reach his conclusion 
that “appealing to formal norms adopted by [the] Congress fails as a general method for substantiating 
attributions of legislative intent.”  See id. at 1010–13.  For instance, he considers the question of proper 
attribution of intent when a bill has been amended before passage and “how to reconcile conflicting, 
uncoordinated intentions” of committee members and amendment authors.  Id. at 1016–17.  He argues that 
legislative procedure does not provide an answer to the question.  Id. at 1017.  Nourse offers several 
explanations, including, among other things, whether the amendment appears in an amendment proposed long 
after the committee text is reported, or whether the amendment was offered by an opponent of the bill.  NOURSE, 
MISREADING LAW, supra note 21, at 73–76, 83–85. 
63 NOURSE, MISREADING LAW, supra note 21, at 68–79. 
64 Id. at 69, 79–85. 
65 Id. at 69, 85–88. 
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Rather, the best legislative evidence depends on when it occurs, how it 
occurs, and whether it is reflects a bipartisan consensus.66 
5. Principle 5: “What Is Unthinkable to a Judge May Be Quite Thinkable to a 
[Legislator]”: Because legislative rules create “process-based expectations” 
that shape the legislature’s decision, courts should recognize that what 
judicially might be considered an absurd result is instead precisely the result 
dictated by faithful application of the rules.67 
 
Under legislative decision theory, lawyers rely on the “public evidence of 
[the] context” of the legislature’s action read in light of its “rules of proceeding” to 
determine a statute’s meaning.68  Constitutionally sanctioned—unlike judicial canons 
of construction “and every other (traditional) method of statutory interpretation”69—
legislative rules provide “a contextual code” for determining what the legislature did 
or did not do in light of a majoritarian process “leading to conduct—enacting a law.”70 
While “the idea of legislative intent has been a highly durable organizing 
principle in the law of statutory interpretation,”71 it has been subject to an 
interminable debate centering on “whether [the] Congress has a mind”72 and the 
efficacy of endeavors to “think [one’s] way as best [one] can into the minds of the 
enacting legislators and imagine how they would have wanted the statute applied to 
the case at bar.”73  Of necessity, the traditional search for legislative intent is one of 
reconstructing an intent to support “claims about the specific way the legislature 
meant to answer the precise question at issue” in difficult cases where it is more likely 
than not that “the legislature gave no particular thought to the [interpretive issue] and 
had no intent concerning it.”74 
Under legislative decision theory, the traditional search for, or disdain of, 
legislative intent gives way to a fruitful search for pragmatic intent where “[a]ction-
in-context yields the necessary information to determine meaning.”75  The search for 
pragmatic intent is focused on legislative evidence that reflects majoritarian group 
decisions made according to the legislature’s own procedures and does not require an 
 
66 Id. at 69, 88–91. 
67 Id. at 69, 91–95. 
68 Id. at 135–36. 
69 Id. at 162–67. 
70 See id. at 142–44, 146–47. 
71 John F. Manning, Without the Pretense of Legislative Intent, 130 HARV. L. REV. 2397, 2405 (2017). 
72 Succinctly, this is the “metaphysical” question of whether the legislature, as a group of individuals, can 
have a single, occurrent mental state at the time of enactment.  See NOURSE, MISREADING LAW, supra note 21, 
at 137–46.  Intent skepticism takes the view that the legislature cannot have such a mental state because the 
internally held, largely unrevealed and practically unascertainable state of mind of each relevant participant in 
the legislative process is neither contemporaneously in agreement, nor properly delegated to a smaller group—
and thus cannot be properly aggregated.  See, e.g., Manning, supra note 71, at 2406–07; NOURSE, MISREADING 
LAW, supra note 21, at 144–46.  Again, this is a gross oversimplification, but it suffices for our purposes here. 
73 Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 
800, 817 (1983). 
74 Manning, supra note 71, at 2410 (citing HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL 
PROCESS 4–5 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., Foundation Press 1994) (1958)). 
75 NOURSE, MISREADING LAW, supra note 21, at 144. 
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inquiry into the minds of legislatures.76  This is how legislators understand what 
happened during a statute’s enactment, and lawyers should use that evidence to 
determine a statute’s effect.77  Legislative decision theory embodies traditional legal 
reasoning by “infer[ing] intent from action or behavior.”78  “The only real way to 
make sense of [the legislature’s] decisions is [to] start at the end [and] reverse 
engineer a text that is made sequentially over time” as dictated by legislative 
procedure.79 
Nourse illustrates the application of legislative decision theory with several 
examples.  One example, analyzing judicial confusion over the meaning of the word 
“utilized” in the Federal Advisory Committee Act, which subjected any panel 
“established or utilized” by the President to certain transparency requirements,80 is 
helpful here.  In Public Citizen v. U.S. Department of Justice,81 which is “taught as a 
controversial case,” 82 the Supreme Court considered whether the Act applied to the 
American Bar Association’s judicial nomination screening committees. 
The majority read the word in a narrow, technical sense to find that the 
committees were not “utilized” by the President and were not subject to the Act; to 
hold otherwise would permit a “woolly” word to produce absurd results by applying 
the transparency requirements to practically every meeting of the President with two 
or more persons.83  The concurring Justices thought the committees were plainly used 
by the President and that the majority’s approach “amend[ed] the statute by judicial 
interpretation,” but also thought the Act unduly interfered with the President’s 
constitutional powers of appointment.84  Both sides examined the enactment history 
in reaching their conclusions.85 
In Public Citizen, we can see how Nourse’s five principles work in practice 
to aid judges in straightforwardly reading legislation.86  As Nourse points out, the 
Court could have easily resolved Public Citizen by “understanding when [the] 
Congress added the term ‘utilize[d]’ to the statute.”87  The term was added for the 
first time when the bill was in conference committee and was “contrary to the bills 
passed in both [houses]”; under both U.S. House and U.S. Senate rules, a conference 
committee may not alter text that is not in disagreement between the two houses88—
illustrating Principle 3, “Legislative Rules Can Help Interpret Statutes.”  No other 
 
76 Id. at 141–43.  
77 See id. at 153–56 (arguing that evidence of “minority views and post hoc manipulations” should not be 
used because they conflict with the majoritarian decision-making process that produced the statute).  Id. at 123. 
78 Id. at 142. 
79 Id. at 157. 
80 Nourse, Decision Theory, supra note 38, at 92–93. 
81 Public Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440 (1989). 
82 Nourse, Decision Theory, supra note 38, at 93. 
83 Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 464–65. 
84 Id. at 469–70, 482–83. 
85 Id. at 455, 458–63, 474–76. 
86 Nourse herself does not use Public Citizen to illustrate all five principles; I do so both for economy 
reasons and because I think it can bear the weight of the illustration. 
87 Nourse, Decision Theory, supra note 38, at 93. 
88 Id. at 93–94. 
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enactment history in Public Citizen matters, because “the conference report was 
simple, strong, and proximate” and “was the last act on the precise statutory term at 
issue”89—illustrating Principle 2,  “Statutes Follow a Sequence.”  Because a legislator 
would not read the conference committee report as materially changing the text, a 
court should not read it that way either.90  The conference report’s silence on the 
meaning of the unaltered text is precisely what a legislator would expect, while “[a] 
judge, however, might read this silence as erroneously significant [rather than] 
foreordained” by the rules91—illustrating Principle 5, “What Is Unthinkable to a 
Judge May Be Quite Thinkable to a [Legislator].”  The majority recited committee 
reports from prior Congresses considering legislation that did not pass;92 those reports 
of a failed statutory election are contextually divorced from the enacting Congress’s 
process—illustrating Principle 1, “Statutes Are Elections.”  Moreover, even when the 
majority cited committee reports from the enacting Congress, it overlooked that the 
committee reports came before the disputed term entered the final text and the 
conference report was, in context, the controlling document—illustrating Principle 4,  
“Typologies of Legislative History May Mislead.”  Public Citizen, as explained by 
Nourse, stands for the proposition that one should “never read legislative history 
without knowing [the] Congress’s own rules.”93 
Legislative decision theory provides a “minimalist” theory, unencumbered 
by cognitive biases flowing from lawyers’ common-law education, that “provides an 
important corrective to debates on statutory interpretation.”94  It provides a “self-
reinforcing rule of statutory interpretation” that, among other things, “reduc[es] 
incentives for legislative manipulation” and increases incentives for following its own 
rules.95  There are obstacles, however, on the path to implementing this theory. 
 
B.  WHY WE HAVEN’T BEEN DOING IT ALREADY: LEGAL CITATION AS AN 
OBSTACLE TO WIDER IMPLEMENTATION OF LEGISLATIVE DECISION 
THEORY  
 
There are several obstacles that must be overcome before legislative decision 
theory can be widely implemented by lawyers.  One issue Nourse describes is 
teaching  lawyers and “judges how to read the legislative record the way a [legislator] 
would read the record.”96  Legislatures must “do a lot more to increase the intelligent 
consumption of” legislative evidence by making it easier to find in online databases 
and by identifying winners and losers through annotations to votes.97  Legislatures 
 
89 Id. at 95. 
90 Id. 
91 NOURSE, MISREADING LAW, supra note 21, at 92–93. 
92 Public Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 455–60 (1989). 
93 Nourse, Decision Theory, supra note 38, at 92, 95–97. 
94 Kevin McGravey, Book Review, 15 PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS 1134, 1135 (2017) (reviewing NOURSE, 
MISREADING LAW, supra note 21 and K. SABEEL RAHMAN, DEMOCRACY AGAINST DOMINATION (2016)). 
95 NOURSE, MISREADING LAW, supra note 21, at 100. 
96 See id. at 186. 
97 See id. at 186–87. 
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should also provide context by having independent staff agencies prepare 
authoritative process-tracing timelines for all major legislation that provide the key 
information needed to reverse engineer a text.98  Each house “should . . . create new 
rules, or enforce existing ones, to avoid abuse” of process, such as post–enactment 
manufacturing of reports and floor colloquies.99  Legislatures should accord courts 
the respect they desire by relieving judges from crushing dockets filled with 
“politically [un]controversial” matters through “bipartisan default rules” addressing 
“attorneys’ fees[,] expert witnesses, statutes of limitation, extraterritorial effect, and 
similar matters . . . to limit litigation.”100  Finally, the judicial confirmation process 
should be “regularized” into a transparent, bipartisan process in which “senators must 
insist . . . that nominees pledge not to blind themselves to legislative evidence.”101 
Another obstacle to the wider implementation of legislative decision theory, 
and one that appears to have been overlooked, is current legal citation practice.  Quite 
simply, legal citation under the Bluebook (and other jurisdiction-specific or 
specialized practice citation manuals) does not permit lawyers to describe the “public 
evidence of [the] context” of the legislature’s action read in light of its “rules of 
proceeding”102—Public Citizen demonstrates this.  Despite the importance of the 
conference report in legislative procedure, the Bluebook forms do not differentiate 
between committee and conference reports on a bill, and the important differences 
are unexplained or unindicated.103  This reflects lawyers’ unfamiliarity with 
“congressional basics,” which has caused Supreme Court “[J]ustices [to] debate 
[whether] a conference report [is] really different from a committee report.”104  The 
Bluebook’s lack of care in this area stands in stark contrast to the care with which the 
Bluebook requires distinguishing the weight of authority of cases, their prior or 
subsequent history, and their precedential value.105 
There are other ways in which legal citation prevents the expert process 
tracing and reverse engineering of a statute.  Procedural restraints govern the 
legislative process, and there are consequences for violating or disregarding those 
rules.  Further, there are multiple versions of the text and amendments thereto, and 
these form the basis for each stage of formal deliberation.  These restraints and 
versions are not explained by, and the Bluebook does not require the use of, 
explanatory parentheticals to note procedural postures or to differentiate text 
versions.106  Knowing whether an amendment died because it was voted down or 
because it violated chamber rules is useful in understanding whether the chamber 
 
98 See id. at 187. 
99 Id. 
100 See id. at 187–88. 
101 See id. at 188.  This proposal will have less relevance in states where judges either are popularly elected 
or regularly rely on legislative evidence. 
102 See id. at 135–36. 
103 See BLUEBOOK 20th ed., supra note 1, at 135, 138.  This difference has not been easily grasped by 
judges.  
104 NOURSE, MISREADING LAW, supra note 21, at 3.  Which, of course, it is.  Id. 
105 BLUEBOOK 20th ed., supra note 1, at 106–13. 
106 Id. at 136 (“A parenthetical indicating the date and stage of the bill may be provided in order to 
distinguish among multiple versions.” (emphasis added)). 
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made a substantive decision to reject the amendment’s language.107  Legal citation 
does not provide any method for indicating a chamber’s action on an amendment—
indeed, it does not provide a method for citing amendments at all.108 
 
1. Legal Citation as Legal Thought 
 
“Without citation, there is simply no traditional legal [thought].”109  Legal 
thought—the process of constructing a legal argument for or against a proposition—
requires a keen appreciation for, and attentive use of, the relevant authorities.  “It is 
not without interest and importance that lawyers and judges refer to the things they 
cite as authorities and that a brief is sometimes called a ‘memorandum of points and 
authorities.’”110  More than any other discipline, “law is . . . an authoritative practice” 
that relies on careful accounting of the reliability of authority.111 
Thus, “the pieces of information someone might need in order to [construct 
a citation and] evaluate the legal support offered for a given proposition . . . cover[] 
every single point in the standard case citation format[:] 
1. What is the name of the case; 
2. How to find it: where in the reporters it is assembled and archived; 
3. When it was decided and its contemporary relevance; 
4. Which court decided it, the level of its authoritativeness, and its 
jurisdiction; 
5. Whether it is good law. Have any subsequent cases rethought, rewritten, 
or substantially changed its holdings? 
6. The precise meaning of the decision; 
7. Where in the text of the decision that central meaning can be found, by 
page number; and 
8. Why this case is being introduced in this time and place: that is, how it 
related to the assertion for which it is being raised.”112 
 
“[B]y treating [legal citation] not as random blobs of information” 
mechanically strung together, “but instead containing everything you need” to speak 
about a case, “the conventions of basic citation form become a fairly simple, almost 
elegant way of presenting this information in readily-available, comprehensible 
form.”113  Legal citation influences legal thought and shapes the direction of the law 
 
107 For example, “[t]he deletion of a provision in a pending bill discloses the legislative intent to reject the 
proposal.”  Smith v. Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d 611, 616–17 (Tex. 1980). 
108 See BLUEBOOK 20th ed., supra note 1, at 136–42. 
109 David S. Coale, Classical Citation, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 733, 734 (2001). 
110 Schauer, supra note 25, at 1934. 
111 See id.  Schauer thinks that this reliance on authoritative sources elevates that reliability over “the 
content (or even the correctness) of ideas, arguments, and conclusions,” but that claim seems to be as much of 
an exaggeration as the one he is criticizing.  See id. at 1934 n.11 (stating that Posner “exaggerates” when he 
wrote that “authority and hierarchy play a role in law that would be inimical to scientific inquiry”).   
112 Franklin, supra note 22, at 131. 
113 Id. at 132. 
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by leading the judge to inescapable, sometimes counterintuitive, rulings in favor of a 
litigant.114  It does this in at least three ways.115 
First, citation provides logical support for arguments by explaining how each 
authority supports a legal conclusion urged to a court (e.g., the precedential status of 
each authority).116  Failure to appropriately document a proposition of law with proper 
citation, then, dooms that proposition.117  Thus, a lawyer must explain how each item 
of legislative evidence relates to her argument. 
Second, citation establishes the lawyer’s personal credibility and that her 
arguments are legally and ethically sound.  For example, consider the use of authority 
that contradicts the authority one uses to support a proposition.  Contrary to one 
critique that signaling adverse authority is “substantively irrelevant to convincing a 
reader of the point,”118 what the practice demonstrates is that the lawyer is fully aware 
of both the ethical duty of candor to the tribunal119 and her facility with the doctrine 
residing in the texts.120  A lawyer who believes she may safely ignore contrary 
authority raises several questions about her competence or truthfulness.121 
Finally, citation increases an argument’s persuasiveness when it 
demonstrates the underlying policy of a legal rule, rather than dryly reciting 
precedents,122 such as when public rights trump private morals.123 
One can easily see that these three purposes apply with equal force to 
legislative evidence under legislative decision theory.  First, required disclosure of 
the precedential status of legislative evidence and its support for a stated proposition 
 
114 SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER, supra note 23, at 37–41, 65–66. 
115 See Coale, supra note 109, at 733–35. 
116 Id. at 734; BLUEBOOK 20th ed., supra note 1, at 58–60 (explaining the placement of citations and signals 
used to indicate an authority’s support for a proposition). 
117 See, e.g., Religious of Sacred Heart v. Houston, 836 S.W.2d 606, 611 (Tex. 1992) (affirming appellate 
court’s refusal to rely on a prior opinion decided “without citation to authority” in which the offending court 
surveyed a number of cases to reach its conclusion but did not include pinpoint citations for any, save one). 
118 Michael Bacchus, Strung Out: Legal Citation, The Bluebook, and the Anxiety of Authority, 151 U. PA. 
L. REV. 245, 267 (2002). 
119 See TEX. DISCIPLINARY R.  PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.03(a)(4), reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN., tit. 
2, subtit. G, app. A (West 2013); accord MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3(a)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 
2016).  Although the rule does not require “a disinterested exposition of the law [by the lawyer, the lawyer] 
should recognize the existence of pertinent legal authorities. . . .  The underlying concept is that legal argument 
is a discussion seeking to determine the legal premises properly applicable to the case.”  TEX. DISCIPLINARY 
RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.03 cmt. 3 (1989). 
120 Douglas R. Richmond, The Ethics of Zealous Advocacy: Civility, Candor, and Parlor Tricks, 34 TEX. 
TECH L. REV. 3, 41 (2002) (“Good advocates freely reveal adverse authority, accompanied by arguments 
criticizing the cases or other authority disclosed or distinguishing them.”). 
121 See, e.g., HL Farm Corp. v. Self, 820 S.W.2d 372, 375 n.2 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, writ granted) 
(condemning appellant’s “attorney [for] knowingly ignoring contrary authority [cited in appellee’s brief] that 
[was] directly on point” after attorney confessed at oral argument he knew of the contrary authority, but did not 
cite it because he thought it was “wrong”). 
122 Coale, supra note 109, at 735. 
123 See, e.g., Milliken v. City Council of Weatherford, 54 Tex. 388, 389, 393 (1881) (striking down city 
ordinance barring prostitutes’ residence within the city’s limits under constitutional provision prohibiting 
common-law outlawry, which withdrew “the protection of the law” from outlaws, on the grounds that the 
prostitutes, while not meeting contemporaneous standards of womanhood, were “still human beings, entitled to 
shelter and the protection of the law”); see also David J. Seipp, The Distinction Between Crime and Tort in the 
Early Common Law, 76 B.U. L. REV. 59, 64 (1996) (explaining the operation of outlawry). 
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would mean, for example, that the superior status of the conference committee report 
in Public Citizen would have been explicit and any detours into the House report 
unfruitful.  Second, the requirement to disclose contrary authority would prevent 
picking and choosing legislative evidence and require that lawyers would have to 
disclose the legislative evidence that is more proximate to the relevant decision.  
Lawyers could not, for instance, spend time discussing a House report and House 
debate that happened long before contested language was added by the Senate after 
cloture without also spending as much time on the Senate’s work.124  Finally, the 
enhanced persuasiveness of an argument’s additional grounding in the underlying 
policy would mean that lawyers would rely on the legislative evidence furnished by 
uncontradicted floor debate to understand, for example, that a deadline for an 
interlocutory appeal of a remand order in a class action suit was a ceiling, not a floor, 
because the policy behind the bill was reducing delay in adjudicating these costly 
suits.125  Because legal citation is mostly unconcerned with legislation by design, 
lawyers deprive themselves of their tested methods for providing comprehensibility 
in legal argument. 
 
2.  Legal Citation Is Designed for Common-Law Thought  
 
We now know that the Bluebook was conceived as an effort by Karl Llewellyn 
and William Field, when they were Yale Law Journal editors, to design and enforce 
uniformity of citation in American law reviews, extend this uniformity to the 
American Law Institute restatements, and eventually direct the citing of all case 
law.126  Llewellyn and Field sought “uniformity” in citation not for bibliographic 
purposes but to permit the sophisticated use of case law when reasoning from 
authority.  “[Focused] almost entirely on the citation of cases,” the guide reflects that, 
[a]bove all, Llewellyn was committed to “case law.” . . .  In all [his] 
writings, Llewellyn tried to demonstrate the meaning and uses of a case—
what a specific case meant and didn’t mean as a precedent, and how best to 
understand the evolution of case law through the common law system and 
tradition. . . .  Since Llewellyn’s terrain was the attentive and meticulous 
deployment of case law, not the disregard of case law, it is very 
understandable . . . that Llewellyn would greatly want a reliable system of 
legal citation—most importantly a reliable system of citing case law.127 
 
124 As Nourse demonstrates was the case in United Steelworkers of American v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 
(1979).  See NOURSE, MISREADING LAW, supra note 21, at 82–83. 
125 Id. at 90–91. 
126 See Fred R. Shapiro & Julie Graves Krishnaswami, The Secret History of the Bluebook, 100 MINN. L. 
REV. 1563, 1575, 1579 (2016).  The two editors’ 1920 eight-page booklet The Writing of a Case Note contained 
a page of citation rules.  Id. at 1569–75.  Those rules were “the embryo that has grown into the 582-page 
behemoth that is the Bluebook’s 20th edition in 2015.”  Id. at 1573–74. 
127 Id. at 1575 (citing E-mail from Paul Gewirtz, Professor, Yale L. Sch., to Fred. R. Shapiro, Assoc. 
Librarian for Collections & Access and Lecturer in Legal Research, Yale L. Sch. (Aug. 11, 2015, 14:57 EST) 
(on file with Shapiro & Krishnaswami)).  
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Against this background, the Bluebook was not created to serve “Langdellian 
orthodoxy [focused] on a few thousand judicial decisions,”128 fixed in time and served 
as the whole repository of legal doctrine.129  Instead, the Bluebook was born to serve 
the “grand and persuasive common law tradition”130 in which “great Judges . . . kept 
the law a living institution, moving with our civilization and doing justice as men can 
see it.”131  And as the Bluebook was created just before statute-making began in 
earnest under the New Deal,132 legislation had not assumed its modern importance 
and thus required little attention from Llewellyn and Field and their successors. 
As a general work, the Bluebook cannot cover most specialized questions.133  
Reliance on its national system “necessarily bear[s] limited relation to the local 
experience and, [left unchecked, could] possibly do away with it altogether.”134  This 
is best demonstrated by the special cases of Texas and New York in according 
precedential status to state court decisions. 
Due to its historically high workload in supervising fourteen intermediate 
appellate courts, the Texas Supreme Court developed a robust, rather sophisticated, 
and sometimes confusing “writ history” system of assigning notations to petitions for 
review that accorded varying levels of precedential effect to the underlying Courts of 
Appeals opinions.135  For example, the notation “writ refused”136 means that both “the 
 
128 Alfred E. Conard, A Lovable Law Review, 44 J. LEG. EDUC. 1, 4 (1994). 
129 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 473 (3d ed. 2005). 
130 S. Alan Childress, Foreword to KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING 
APPEALS ii (2015 ed. 1960).  Llewellyn’s commitment to case law was well-known by his contemporaries.  See, 
e.g., Arthur L. Corbin, A Tribute to Karl Llewellyn, 71 YALE L.J. 805, 807–08 (1962).  This is not unsurprising 
to anyone deeply familiar with Llewellyn’s work; “[a]lthough Llewellyn gleefully exposed the manipulability 
of precedent and the openness of the rules of statutory interpretation, he consistently disclaimed the most radical 
implications of these observations . . . .”  Brian Z. Tamanaha, Understanding Legal Realism, 87 TEX. L. REV. 
731, 766 (2009).  Because a number of factors, including legal rules and doctrine, “prompt judges to engage in 
a good-faith effort to conduct an unbiased search for the correct legal result,” Llewellyn thought that “[a] skilled 
lawyer asked to predict the fate of a case on appeal . . . ought ‘to average correct prediction of outcome eight 
times out of ten, and better than that if he knows the appeal counsel on both sides or sees the briefs.’”  Id. at 766–
67 (emphasis added) (quoting KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 19–
26, 45–51 (1960)). 
131 Corbin, supra note 130, at 807–08. 
132 See CALABRESI, supra note 17, at 44–45. 
133 There are citation manuals for specific states, for specialized practices, or as supplements to the 
Bluebook.  Courts have adopted these manuals, issued their own preferred citation forms, or follow a unique 
house style passed down from reporter to reporter.  And while lawyers may, and do, use the style manuals issued 
by their state’s official reporters, state bar associations have also issued state-specific manuals.  Specialty bars 
have followed suit for their practice areas, as have federal and state administrative agencies. 
134 Pierre Legrand, Sigla Law, 23 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 123, 136 (1995).  The same also occurs with foreign 
competitors.  For example, the Bluebook’s handling of Canadian materials does not express the folkways of 
lawyers there and is displaced by a more faithful expression.  Barbara Bintliff, Guide to Legal Citations: A 
Canadian Perspective in Common Law Provinces, 5 LEGAL REFERENCE SERVS. Q. 114, 115–17 (1985) 
(reviewing CHIN-SHIH TANG, GUIDE TO LEGAL CITATION: A CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE IN COMMON LAW 
PROVINCES (1984)) (comparing the Bluebook’s treatment of Canadian materials with the Guide and concluding 
that the Guide “does reflect the actual title and current Canadian usage more accurately”). 
135 See Hon. Ted Z. Robertson & James W. Paulsen, Rethinking the Texas Writ of Error System, 17 TEX. 
TECH L. REV. 1, 4–42 (1986); see also James Hambleton, Notations for Subsequent Histories in Civil Cases, 65 
TEX. B.J. 694, 694–96 (2002). 
136 Under the current discretionary review system, petitions for review have replaced applications for writs 
of error, and the word “writ” in the notation is replaced by “pet.”  Because our concern here is historical, I use 
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judgment of the court of appeals is correct and . . . the principles of law declared in 
[its] opinion . . . are correctly determined . . . .”137  A “writ refused” opinion has the 
same precedential effect as a Supreme Court opinion; all lower courts must apply that 
court of appeals opinion exactly as they would the court’s own opinions even if it 
requires “reluctantly follow[ing] a poorly reasoned . . . precedent.”138  Correctly cited 
writ history “immediately assists [a] court in evaluating the authority.”139 
The writ history system created “some peculiarities in Texas citations,”140 
for which Texas lawyers demanded guidance to avoid vague understandings of, and 
loose reckoning with, a case’s writ history.141  In 1966, the Texas Law Review 
published the first edition of the Texas Rules of Form142—the Greenbook—which 
made “very great contributions . . . to an understanding of the peculiarities of Texas 
law” through careful explanation of “the precedential effect[s] of various Supreme 
Court actions” by describing the appellate system’s historical workings and the 
implications of those workings on discerning precedent.143  Viewed by Texas lawyers 
and judges as a comprehensive system governing the citation of most materials that 
would be cited to Texas tribunals,144 the Greenbook has effectively displaced the 
Bluebook in matters of Texas law.145 
 
the older notations. 
137 TEX. R. APP. P. 133(a) (repealed).  This is not the case for petition denied cases in the Court of Criminal 
Appeals.  See Andrew T. Solomon, A Simple Prescription for Texas’s Ailing Court System: Stronger Stare 
Decisis, 37 ST. MARY’S L. J. 417, 434 n.58 (2006). 
138 See ‘21’ Int’l Holdings, Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 856 S.W.2d 479, 485 (Tex. App.—San 
Antonio 1993, no writ) (Peeples, J., concurring) (applying H. Rouw Co. v. Ry. Express Agency, 154 S.W.2d 
143 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1941, writ ref’d)). 
139 Joe Greenhill, Uniform Citations for Briefs: With Observations on the Meanings of Stamps or Markings 
Used in Denying Writs of Error, 27 TEX. B.J. 323, 323 (1964) [hereinafter Greenhill, Uniform Citations for 
Briefs].  While the 1964 article includes much of his 1949 material, Greenhill updated his forms in light of both 
the tenth edition of the Bluebook and Price’s Practical Manual.  See generally id. 
140 Joe R. Greenhill, Preface of TEXAS RULES OF FORM 3 (Tex. Law Review Ass’n ed., 1st ed. 1966). 
141 See, e.g., Robert W. Stayton, Courts––Jurisdiction of Texas Supreme Court—Act of 1927, 7 TEX. L. 
REV. 115, 117–25 (1928); E.O. Mather, Comment, Appeal and Error—Application for Writ of Error—Orders 
of Supreme Court, 9 TEX. L. REV. 562, 562–63, 566 (1928); Fred M. Cassidy, Comment, Appeal and Error—
Refusal of Writ of Error as Approval of Opinion, 15 TEX. L. REV. 124, 124–25 (1936); E.W. Fountain, Current 
Decisions and Legislation Affecting the Oil Industry, 18 TEX. L. REV. 48, 57–58 (1939); Order Amending Rule 
Governing the Supreme Court, 131 Tex. v, v–vi (1939); Gordon Simpson, Notations on Applications for Writs 
of Error, 12 TEX. B.J. 547 (1949); Frank M. Wilson, Hints on Precedential Evaluation, 24 TEX. B.J. 1037 
(1961); Zollie Steakley, What the Heck in Two Respects, 30 TEX. B.J. 697 (1967). 
142 GREENBOOK 1st ed., supra note 1.  The book has a very light green cover. 
143 Id. at 45. 
144 See James W. Paulsen & James Hambleton, One Book, Two Book, Green Book, Blue Book: Random 
Observations on the Texas Rules of Form (6th ed.) and that Harvard Book, 52 TEX. B.J. 44, 45 (1989).  The 
first edition of the Greenbook was heralded as “a comprehensive compilation of citation forms for Texas 
authorities” that “w[ould] soon be adopted by the courts and the Bar as the uniform citation system of the state.”  
New Publication, 29 TEX. B.J. 928 (1966).  The Greenbook disclaims being “a complete citation guide” for 
Texas law and claims it is meant only to “supplement . . . [t]he Bluebook to address citation problems unique to 
Texas.”  TEXAS RULES OF FORM: THE GREENBOOK v (Texas Law Review eds., 13th ed. 2015).  On the other 
hand, the Greenbook does claim that it “is a lens through which the full spectrum of Texas legal materials may 
be cited and understood” and “provides the tools to cite Texas authorities with precision.”  Id. 
145 See Bryan A. Garner, Ten Tips for Writing at Your Law Firm, 85 MICH. B.J. 60, 61 (2006) (“In Texas, 
every knowledgeable practitioner follows the [Greenbook].”). 
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New York has a complex court system as well,146 and the New York state 
courts’ Tanbook147 provides a highly detailed roadmap for citing New York 
authorities.  “[T]he Tanbook gets New York law right every time, and the Bluebook 
gets it wrong every time.”148  This includes providing methods149 for lawyers to 
“explain whether a case is binding or persuasive, and if persuasive, how persuasive” 
in the context of the byzantine state court system.150 
These two brief examples show that lawyers have refused to be hindered in 
their thinking about case law when the Bluebook failed to meet the specific 
circumstances in their jurisdictions.  Lawyers, however, have not been as engaged 
when it comes to the Bluebook’s treatment of legislation, with very real consequences. 
 
3.  How Legal Citation Has Hindered Thinking About Legislation  
 
The Bluebook has shaped our thinking about legislation, and not for the better.  
Owing to the Bluebook’s common-law origins, legislation is treated with less care 
despite its formal place above cases in the Bluebook hierarchy of authority.151  
Because of this lack of care, for example, “we no longer read the statutes” enacted by 
the Congress; “[w]e read imitation law.”152  And unlike the sixteenth edition’s 
changes to signaling practices,153 this change occurred practically without notice. 
The “real law” is the session laws passed each year by both houses; approved, or 
acquiesced in, by the President; and compiled in the United States Statutes at 
Large.154  Session laws employ a unique amendatory scheme and are troublesome to 
read because they require one to locate the older session law being amended and read 
the old law and the new law side by side to determine what the current law is.155  The 
United States Code “is something like a Cliffs Notes guide to the real law” because it 
is merely a compilation of the session laws, arranged and rewritten to present a “single 
clean text,” incorporating all session law amendments.156 
 
146 Quintin Johnstone, New York State Courts: Their Structure, Administration and Reform Possibilities, 
43 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 915, 915–21 (1999). 
147 Formally, NEW YORK LAW REPORTS STYLE MANUAL (The Law Reporting Bureau of the State of N.Y. 
ed., 2007) [hereinafter TANBOOK]. 
148 Gerald Lebovits, New Edition of State’s “Tanbook” Implements Extensive Revisions in Quest for 
Greater Clarity, 74 N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N J. 8, 14 (2002). 
149 See TANBOOK, supra note 147, at v. 
150 Lebovits, supra note 148, at 17. 
151 BLUEBOOK 20th ed., supra note 1, at 61. 
152 Tobias A. Dorsey, Some Reflections on Not Reading the Statutes, 10 GREEN BAG 2D 283 (2007). 
153 The sixteenth edition’s revisions were the latest in a series of alterations to the Bluebook’s instructions 
for signals, and they were the most significant.  Faithfully implementing the sixteenth edition would have 
resulted in “see” preceding practically every authority directly supporting the cited proposition; that is, “see” 
would now precede practically every citation to authority—other than a direct quote—for which no other signal 
was used.  Melissa H. Weresh, The ALWD Citation Manual: A Truly Uniform System of Citation, 6 LEGAL 
WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 257, 260 (2000).  The seventeenth edition overturned this innovation and 
returned to the fifteenth edition’s rule governing “see.”  THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION 
(Columbia Law Review Ass’n et al. eds., 17th ed. 2000). 
154 Dorsey, supra note 152, at 283–84. 
155 Id. at 284, 289–91. 
156 Id. at 284–85. 
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The Code “is only ‘prima facie’ evidence of the law, while the Statutes at 
Large [are] ‘legal’ evidence” of the law; when the two conflict, the Statutes at Large 
prevail.157  Lawyers formerly read the Statutes at Large for this very reason, and the 
Bluebook reflected this; the seventh edition (1947) required a citation to the Statutes 
at Large first, and then to the Code.158  The eighth edition (1949) dropped the 
requirement for a Statutes at Large citation when a particular title of the Code had 
been enacted into positive law; the ninth edition (1955) dropped the requirement for 
a Statutes at Large citation for amendatory laws; and the eleventh edition (1967) 
practically eliminated the requirement for a Statutes at Large citation, retaining it only 
when “the language discussed differs materially from that in [the Code].”159 
The Bluebook now equates the Code with “real law,” ignoring the Statutes 
and thus effecting a radical change in how lawyers and judges think about statutes 
and how to interpret them—a change that, unlike the furor over the Bluebook’s change 
to the signal “see,” occurred “without any real debate.”160  A Supreme Court majority 
may now sensibly claim under the Bluebook that it is examining the “text as written” 
when it relies on the Code’s prior and current compilation of session laws over a 
minority’s dissent based on the actual laws in the Statutes at Large.161 
 
II.  IMPROVING CITATION OF LEGISLATION  
 
In this Part, I apply legislative decision theory to our cases from the 
Introduction to show that the group-authorized162 legislative evidence indicates that 
the Supreme Court of Texas reached conclusions directly contrary to the Texas 
Legislature’s decisions when it enacted the 1995 revision of the Family Code and the 
1981 revision of the Tax Code because the court misread the relevant legislative 
evidence.  Keeping Texas as my case study, I then examine how legal citation 
mistreats four types of legislative evidence and suggest improvements in this 
treatment. 
 
A.  APPLYING LEGISLATIVE DECISION THEORY TO JONES AND FLEMING FOODS  
 
The court’s misunderstanding of the statutes in Jones and Fleming Foods is 
attributable to its failure to understand the role of rule-required bill printings.  To 
prevent mistake or misrepresentation, bills are required to be printed at distinct stages 
in the legislative process so that members have the correct text recommended for 
 
157 Id. at 286–87 (footnote omitted). 
158 Id. at 287. 
159 Id. at 287–88. 
160 Id. at 289. 
161 Id. at 288–89 (discussing Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469 (1992)). 
162 By “group-authorized,” I mean nothing more than the evidence produced by the Legislature during the 
majoritarian process, i.e., by the “group . . . acting according to [its] procedures.” NOURSE, MISREADING LAW, 
supra note 21, at 149, 153-55. It does not include “evidence that violates the rules [governing the] group 
decision.” Id. at 153. 
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consideration.163  The printed text is especially critical for the bill’s second reading 
consideration, when amendments may be freely offered and need a simple majority 
for adoption; those amendments are required to be drawn to the reported text both so 
that the amendment is on the same subject164 and so that it clearly indicates what it is 
changing in the reported text.165  
Introduced bills are not printed.166  After the introduced bill is referred to 
committee, neither house may proceed on a bill unless it has been printed and 
distributed to each legislator.167  The first time a bill is printed is when it is favorably 
reported from committee; this printing shows the committee’s amendments, if any, 
proposed to the introduced text.168  Next, it is printed after it is passed by its chamber 
of origin and sent to the other chamber, showing the complete (or “engrossed”) text 
of the bill as finally adopted by the originating chamber.169  If the receiving chamber 
amends the bill, those amendments are printed with the engrossed text.170  If the 
originating house refuses to adopt those amendments, the bill is sent to a conference 
committee; the bill is then printed when a conference committee recommends a single 
text resolving the disagreements between the two houses for their final 
consideration.171 
In Texas, only non-controversial bills, such as bills only affecting a specific 
locality, are routinely not printed at successive stages even after amendment.172  If the 
 
163 E.g., ROBERT LUCE, LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE 518 (1922) 
164 TEX. H. RULE 11, § 2, TEX. H.R. 4, 86th Leg., R.S., 2019 H.J. OF TEX. 50, 134; TEX. S. RULE 7.15, TEX. 
S.R. 5, 2019 S.J. OF TEX. 19, reprinted in Rules of the Senate, TEXAS LEGISLATIVE MANUAL 61. 
165 TEX. H. RULE 11, § 6(j), TEX. H.R. 4, 86th Leg., R.S., 2019 H.J. OF TEX. 50, 136; S.J. OF TEX., 50th 
Leg., 1st C.S. 95 (1950) (ruling on point of order). 
166 See, e.g., TEX. H. RULE 12, § 1(1)(A), TEX. H.R. 4, 86th Leg., R.S., 2019 H.J. OF TEX. 50, 138 
(specifying first printing after committee report); TEX. S. RULE 7.12(b), TEX. S.R. 5, 2019 S.J. OF TEX. 19, 19, 
reprinted in Rules of the Senate, TEXAS LEGISLATIVE MANUAL 59 (specifying first printing after committee 
report). 
167 Thus, if a committee recommends a bill adversely, it is not printed unless a successful minority report 
is made.  See TEX. S. RULE 11.17, TEX. S.R. 5, 2019 S.J. OF TEX. 19, 19, reprinted in Rules of the Senate, TEXAS 
LEGISLATIVE MANUAL 85; Tex. H. Rule 4, §§ 28–29, TEX. H.R. 4, 86th Leg., R.S., 2019 H.J. OF TEX. 50, 87; 
TEXAS HOUSE PRACTICE ¶ 250 (Hugh L. Brady ed., 3d ed. 2017) (“The only purpose of a minority report is to 
give proponents of a bill one last chance to get a bill printed and before the House for consideration . . . .”). 
168 See, e.g., TEX. H. RULE 12, § 1(a)(1)(A), TEX. H.R. 4, 86th Leg., R.S., 2019 H.J. OF TEX. 50, 138; TEX. 
S. RULE 7.12(a), TEX. S.R. 5, 2019 S.J. OF TEX. 19, 19, reprinted in Rules of the Senate, TEXAS LEGISLATIVE 
MANUAL 59. 
169 E.g., TEX. H. RULE 2, § 1(a)(9), TEX. H.R. 4, 86th Leg., R.S., 2019 H.J. OF TEX. 50, 55. 
170 See, e.g., TEX. H. RULE 12, § 1(a)(2), TEX. H.R. 4, 86th Leg., R.S., 2019 H.J. OF TEX. 50, 138; TEX. S. 
RULE 7.21, TEX. S.R. 5, 2019 S.J. OF TEX. 19, 19, reprinted in Rules of the Senate, TEXAS LEGISLATIVE MANUAL 
68. 
171 See, e.g., TEX. H. RULE 12, § 1(a)(3), TEX. H.R. 4, 86th Leg., R.S., 2019 H.J. OF TEX. 50, 138; TEX. S. 
RULE 12.09, TEX. S.R. 5, 2019 S.J. OF TEX. 19, 19, reprinted in Rules of the Senate, TEXAS LEGISLATIVE 
MANUAL 96. 
172 See, e.g., SHARON CARTER & HUGH L. BRADY, TEXAS HOUSE RULES MANUAL 156 (2019) (stating that 
“[c]ommittees have no authority to order not printed bills which they report favorably, except local bills, even 
though such bills may be considered uncontested” and directing clerks to disregard the committee’s order and 
instead print the bill); TEX. S. RULE 11.06, TEX. S.R. 5, 2019 S.J. OF TEX. 19, 19, reprinted in Rules of the 
Senate, TEXAS LEGISLATIVE MANUAL 80 (providing “a recommendation in a report that a bill which is a local 
bill be not printed shall be effective as an order of the Senate that the bill be not printed”); TEX. S. RULE 7.12, 
TEX. S.R. 5, 2019 S.J. OF TEX. 19, reprinted in Rules of the Senate, TEXAS LEGISLATIVE MANUAL 59 (providing 
that Senators receive notice of bills ordered not printed). 
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House decides that a bill is non-controversial and unlikely to attract substantive 
amendment, it may order the bill not printed by a supermajority vote.173  Thus, if a 
bill is not printed, the members do not have the text of the bill in front of them when 
they are voting on the bill. 
The 1981 codification of the Tax Code in Fleming Foods was ordered not 
printed by a supermajority of the House and the Senate.174  Because it was not printed, 
members did not have the text of the bill in front of them when they voted, indicating 
that they decided that the bill’s changes to the law were in fact non-substantive and 
there was no need to read text that was not changing the law.  Conversely, the 1995 
recodification of the Family Code in Jones was printed because no motion to order 
the bill not printed was made.175  This indicates that the members decided that the 
bill’s changes to the law were presumptively substantive and there might be a need to 
read its text. 
Legislative decision theory, then, indicates that the court incorrectly decided 
both Jones and Fleming Foods because the group-authorized evidence shows that the 
Legislature decided it did make a substantive change to the Family Code in 1995 and 
did not make a substantive change to the Tax Code in 1981.  However, legal citation 
did not permit the court to “read legislative history with[] [a] know[ledge] of [the 
Legislature’s] own rules.”176  That is, neither the Bluebook nor the Greenbook 
acknowledges or provides a method of citing this crucial legislative action—or, for 
that matter, any others.  This is akin to omitting guidance that the weight of a case’s 
authority must be explained in a parenthetical to permit immediate evaluation of its 
precedential status177 or omitting a case’s writ history.178  The supreme court ignored 
the contextual code provided by the Legislature’s rules and “unwittingly invent[ed] a 
plain meaning to a statute directly opposed to [the Legislature’s] decision.”179 
Even if one rejects legislative decision theory, a reliable system for citing 
legislation is essential to demonstrate the meaning of an amended statutory text.180  
For textualists, then, specialized legal citation for legislation is necessary to avoid 
fundamental errors about what constitutes the actual text, such as the one made in 
Lamie v. United States Trustee.181  As discussed earlier, the United States Code 
(“Code”) is an unofficial editorial consolidation into a “single clean text” of all current 
 
173 CARTER & BRADY, supra note 172 (noting that bills may be ordered not printed only by suspending the 
rules, which requires two-thirds of the members present). 
174 History of House Bills in the House, H.J. OF TEX., 67th Leg., 4930 (1981) (showing the codification bill 
ordered not printed); History of House Bills in the Senate, S.J. OF TEX., 67th Leg., 2775 (1981) (same). 
175 History of House Bills in the House, H.J. OF TEX., 74th Leg., A68 (1995) (reflecting lack of a successful 
motion to order the bill not printed); History of House Bills in the Senate, S.J. OF TEX., 74th Leg., 4682 (1995) 
(same). 
176 See Nourse, Decision Theory, supra note 38, at 92, 95–97. 
177 BLUEBOOK 20th ed., supra note 1, at 107–10. 
178 GREENBOOK 14th ed., supra note 1, at 21. 
179 NOURSE, MISREADING LAW, supra note 21, at 64, 100–01, 135–36. 
180 Cf. Shapiro & Krishnaswami, supra note 126, at 1575 (citing Gerwitz e-mail describing Llewellyn’s 
likely motivations for creating the Bluebook’s original incarnation). 
181 Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526 (2004). 
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session laws, that is, the laws passed by the Congress and signed by the President.182  
“So if a law has been amended and there is a question about the new meaning, the 
consolidated text is relevant, but does not trump the session laws.”183  In Lamie, the 
Court refused to look at the session laws to resolve a facial ambiguity in the 
Bankruptcy Code as compiled in the Code: “The starting point in discerning 
congressional intent is the existing statutory text . . . and not the predecessor 
statutes.”184  The Court’s statement elevating the Code over the session laws “was a 
casual, almost throwaway, line.  ‘Predecessor statutes’: Put them with the committee 
reports and the dogs that didn’t bark.”185  The Bluebook’s requirement to cite the Code 
without resort to the session laws obscures the text and defeats the textual approach.  
This is not an isolated incident, as further examination of how legal citation obscures 
legislation will demonstrate. 
 
B. HOW LEGAL CITATION MISTREATS LEGISLATIVE EVIDENCE: A STATE-
SPECIFIC CASE STUDY  
 
This importance of legal citation to the expert use of legislation has been 
noticed by others, although not widely so.  The Florida State University Law Review 
developed the Florida Style Manual in direct response to the Bluebook’s inexpert 
handling of legislation.  In preparing its annual Review of Florida Legislation, the 
journal’s editors found that “citation to many Florida-specific sources—particularly 
those generated by the Florida Legislature—would be rendered almost meaningless 
if [the] Bluebook [was] followed.”186  The Texas Tech Law Review published its 
Redbook in 1986 to fill the Greenbook’s gaps with respect to legislative and 
administrative materials;187 while now mainly of historical value because of the lack 
of updates,188 it provides a useful window into those gaps. 
Legal citation of legislation must be modified to ensure that lawyers and 
judges “interpret statutes with[] a better understanding of what the Constitution 
recognizes as legitimate—each house’s rules and proceedings.”189  To avoid a 
monumental task,190 I examine legal citation of legislation primarily using the highly 
distinctive jurisdiction of the State of Texas supplemented with examples from other 
states as is useful.  This “limited consideration of the variations among 
 
182 Dorsey, supra note 152, at 284–85. 
183 Id. at 292. 
184 Lamie, 540 U.S. at 534. 
185 Dorsey, supra note 152, at 292. 
186 FLORIDA STYLE MANUAL (Fla. State Law Review ed., 8th ed. 2019). 
187 TEX. TECH. L. REV., TEXAS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND ADMIN. AGENCY CITATION GUIDE (1st ed. 
1986) [hereinafter TECH REDBOOK]. 
188 A revision of this manual was promised in the early aughts.  Volume 5 Executive Board Notes, 5 TEX. 
TECH. J. ADMIN. L. ix (2004).  However, the first edition remains the only edition.  E-mail from Donna B. Jones, 
Sec’y for Law Review, Tex. Tech. Univ. Sch. of Law (Feb. 16, 2016, 20:23 CST) (on file with author). 
189 NOURSE, MISREADING LAW, supra note 21, at 181. 
190 See Briffault, supra note 32, at 24 (“[W]ith Congress, the fifty states, and thousands of county and 
municipal legislatures to consider, a comprehensive analysis is well beyond my individual capacity.”). 
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Let us start with the workhorse of the legislative process, the bill.  Greenbook 
Rule 14.1.1 directs one to “[c]ite unenacted bills of the Texas Legislature by bill 
number, legislature number, session, and year,” with appropriate designators for the 
session (regular or called) at which the bill was considered.192  Thus, we get this form: 
 
Tex. H.B. 1578, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003). 
 
The Bluebook requires and conveys similar information: 
 
H.R. 1578, 78th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2003).193 
 
Let us look at the various elements of the Greenbook form and what it does, 
or does not, tell us about a bill. 
First, why must we include the abbreviation “Tex.”?  Including “Tex.” is 
likely superfluous in any type of practice in the state where citation to other states’ 
legal materials is infrequent, but more so in the legislative context where citation to 
another state is so rare as to be non-existent.194  There are two important exceptions.  
First, it is required for citations to the Texas Constitution because of its coexistence 
with the U.S. Constitution.  Second, it is required for citations in briefs and other 
material prepared for congressional committees and federal courts and agencies to 
avoid confusion with other state materials. 
Unlike the Bluebook, the Greenbook follows Texas legislative practice and 
uses the abbreviations “H.B.” and “S.B.” followed by the bill number rather than 
importing the congressional forms of “H.R.” and “S.” to denote bills into state 
practice.195  (Unfortunately, the Greenbook does not continue this practice and uses 
the Bluebook congressional forms for resolutions.)196  
 
191 Id. 
192 GREENBOOK 14th ed., supra note 1, at 66. 
193 BLUEBOOK 20th ed., supra note 1, at 135, 137. 
194 A practice approved by Justice Greenhill: “Where the brief is addressed to a Texas court, and it is 
obvious that the citation is to Acts of the Texas Legislature, the word “Texas” may be eliminated . . . .”  Greenhill, 
Uniform Citations for Briefs, supra note 139, at 389.  Even when discussing uniform acts and their consideration 
and application, an unadorned reference will ordinarily be taken to mean a reference to a Texas authority.  In its 
survey of judges and lawyers to determine changes to the fourteenth edition, the Greenbook’s editors retained 
the requirement for “including ‘Tex.’ at the start of the citation [because it] serves as a useful cue to quickly 
differentiate between federal and Texas law” despite a near-even split in opinion as to its retention.  MICHAEL 
J. DAUS, CLAIRE J. TAPSCOTT & ANDREW P. VAN OSSELAER, 2018 TEXAS RULES OF FORM SURVEY RESULTS 
27 (2018).  Nothing certainly prevents a writer from including “Tex.” if necessary to avoid confusion, but it 
seems very unnecessary.  
195 BLUEBOOK 20th ed., supra note 1, at 136, 139. 
196 Compare GREENBOOK 14th ed., supra note 1, at 67, with BLUEBOOK 20th ed., supra note 1, at 136.  
These abbreviations are Bluebook inventions and do not reflect those used by the Congress to denominate 
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What the Greenbook rule ignores is that there may be—and likely are—
several versions of an unenacted bill: the bill as introduced; as reported from 
committee; as passed to engrossment; as finally passed197 in the house of origin; as 
reported by a committee of the other chamber; as amended by the other chamber; as 
finally passed by the other chamber; and as reported by a conference committee.198  
Although enacted bills receive a session law chapter number (as discussed below), 
there is a delay in the chaptering process, and it is sometimes necessary to refer to the 
final version signed by the Governor.  The Greenbook forms do not give the reader 
any idea of which version, if any, the writer consulted; especially in compiling or 
detailing a bill’s legislative history, this information is key to both understanding the 
evolution of a measure and retrieving related information.199 
For example, in discussing the effects of a truancy reform bill, Stephen 
Gilmore states the revenue gain to state government of aggressive truancy law 
enforcement, and cites “Fiscal Note, Tex. H.B. 2398, 84th Leg., R.S. (2015).”200  
However, there are seven versions of the fiscal note for the bill, three of which state 
there is no fiscal implication to state government.201  While it might be inferred that 
the fiscal note referred to is the one prepared for the enrolled bill, the bill was 
significantly amended throughout the process, and that inference is not readily evident 
from the text. 
The Tech Redbook recognized this need and sought to provide forms for 
several of these stages.  Most bills that make it to the floor for consideration are 
committee substitutes.  Using the Tech Redbook form, then, we would get: 
 
Committee Substitute for H.B. 1578, Texas House of Reps., 78th 
Leg., Regular Sess. (2003). 
 
What the Tech Redbook overlooks is that there can be two committee 
substitutes for a bill, one in the originating house and one in the reviewing house.  It 
is common for each house’s committees to report substitute bills, and the text is often 
divergent from the referred bill.  Ordinarily, this version of a bill is referred to as, for 
example, “C.S.H.B. 10” or “C.S.S.B. 10,” and that is the form at the top of the bill 
printing.  Both the author and the reader need to know which committee substitute is 
being cited. 
 
resolutions.  Paul Axel-Lute, Legal Citation Form: Theory and Practice, 75 L. LIBR. J. 148, 156 (1982). 
197 “Finally passed” is a term of art in the Texas Legislature to signify when one house has completed all 
states of consideration and sent a measure to the other house for consideration.  E.g., TEX. H.R. RULE 8, § 19 
(1999), TEX. H.R. 5, 76th Leg., R.S., 1999 H.J. OF TEX. 105 (providing that a “resolution to recall a bill from 
the senate shall be in order if a motion to reconsider the vote by which the bill finally passed has been [properly] 
made and adopted”). 
198 Again, this oversight is likely attributable to a similar oversight by the Bluebook.  Axel-Lute, supra note 
196, at 155. 
199 See NOURSE, MISREADING LAW, supra note 21, at 157 (discussing that reverse engineering of the final 
text’s development is “[t]he only real way to make sense of [the legislature’s] decisions”). 
200 Steven E. Gilmore, Education and its Discontents: The Decriminalization of Truancy and the School-
to-Prison Pipeline in Texas, 18 SCHOLAR 229, 240 (2016). 
201 Legis. Bill File, TEX. H.B. 2398, 84th Legis., R.S. (2015). 
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The Tech Redbook also created a form for companion bills:202 
 
Companion Bill for H.B. 1578, S.B. 266, 78th Leg., Regular Sess. (2003). 
 
This form suggests an unwarranted importance for companion bills.  
Companion status is frequently misunderstood by participants as conferring a 
special status under the rules, especially the rule that permits the substitution of 
substantially similar bills from the other chamber during floor consideration.203  
This rule speeds the process by moving the bill closest to the finish line in the 
legislative process.204  Many believe that the rule only applies to companion bills, 
but it applies broadly to any bill on the “same subject” (in the House)205 or “of the 
same general tenor” (in the Senate).206 
Consider this example: a House bill regulating fireworks in certain counties 
has been placed on the House calendar, and a Senate bill that is substantially the same 
(but not identical) has been reported favorably by a House committee and is awaiting 
scheduling for the floor.  When the House reaches the House bill on its calendar, the 
rule permits the Speaker to lay out the Senate bill instead because both bills are 
eligible for second reading consideration.207  A companion bill may be narrowed or 
enlarged so that it is no longer substantially similar when it catches up to the other 
companion.  While the companion designation may be helpful in identifying bills on 
the same subject, it is not conclusive and might be misleading. 
The Greenbook also does not indicate how one makes pinpoint citations to a 
bill’s provisions, leading authors to omit them with unsatisfactory results.  For 
example, Gilmore writes that “[t]he offense known as ‘Failure to Attend School’ has 
now been repealed, and all cross-references to former Education Code § 25.094 have 
been stricken from the books” and then cites the entire forty-four-section bill, which 
covers thirty-three pages in the session laws, without any pinpoint citations.208  The 
bill expressly repealed the offense in section forty-one; it struck references to the 
repealed section in thirteen other sections.209  In a bill of any length, pinpoint citations 
are critical. 
However, a bill’s pagination does not show up on the HTML or Word 
versions of bills available online; one must access the PDF version online to view the 
correct page and line numbering.  The general appropriations bill uses a unique “bill 
 
202 A companion bill is “[a] bill filed in one chamber that is identical or very similar to a bill filed in the 
opposite chamber.”  TEX. LEGIS. COUNC., LEGISLATIVE GLOSSARY 4 (85th Legis. ed. 2017). 
203 TEX. H. RULE 6, § 10, TEX. H.R. 4, 86th Leg., R.S., 2019 H.J. OF TEX. 50, 109–10; TEX. S. RULE 7.14, 
TEX. S.R. 5, 2019 S.J. OF TEX. 19, 19, reprinted in Rules of the Senate, TEXAS LEGISLATIVE MANUAL 61. 
204 TEXAS LEGISLATIVE MANUAL, 38th Leg., R.S. 201–02 (1923). 
205 TEX. H. RULE 6, § 10, TEX. H.R. 4, 86th Leg., R.S., 2019 H.J. OF TEX. 50, 109–10. 
206 S.J. OF TEX., 38th Leg., R.S. 470 (1923). 
207 See TEXAS HOUSE PRACTICE, supra note 167, at ¶ 501. 
208 Gilmore, supra note 200, at 240.  
209 Act of May 30, 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., ch. 935, § 41(2), 2015 Tex. Gen. Laws 3224, 3255 (repealing 
Educ. Code § 25.094); §§ 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 29, 30, 32, 33, 34, 36, 2015 Tex. Gen. Laws at 3227–30, 3231–
32, 3233, 3250–52. 
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pattern” layout describing strategic goals, sources of funds, and other information 
necessary to understand or recapitulate the items of appropriation being made.  The 
appropriate pinpoint citation, then, depends on the bill and version used. 
Moreover, why must one specify that a bill was considered in a regular 
session?  The Legislature is constitutionally required to hold a regular session of not 
more than 140 days every two years.210   For legislative materials between 1845 and 
1876, the Greenbook declares that one “should simply omit the session designation” 
for those legislatures that only held the regular session;211 that ought to be sufficient 
for modern legislatures.212  The better practice is to designate the session only when 
one is dealing with extraordinary sessions, colloquially termed “special sessions” and 
designated for citation purposes as “called sessions.”213 
Considering the foregoing, we can see that a more expressive citation that 
permits lawyers and judges to discuss a precise stage in the legislative process is, for 
example: 
 
C.S.S.B. 266 (H. Comm. Rpt.) § 8 [or at 10 or at 10:13-11:5], 78th 
Legis. (May 21, 2003) [(companion to H.B. 1578)]. 
 
This example citation prioritizes the most important item of information: this 
bill passed the Senate, and a committee substitute for the engrossed bill was reported 
out of a House committee.  One can easily see what version needs locating.  It includes 
a pinpoint citation to the bill portion supporting an argument and permits one to 
choose an appropriate pinpoint cite: section, page, or page and line numbers.  This 
form indicates the correct session with minimum distraction and permits, but does not 
require, the addition of a helpful parenthetical.  It provides more information without 
being considerably longer than the Greenbook form.  Most importantly, it aids in 
discussing both the procedural history and substantive contents of legislation.  
 
2.  Resolutions  
 
The Greenbook does not handle resolutions much better.  The Greenbook 
speaks of “enacted resolutions.”214  This error seems directly attributable to the 
Bluebook, which speaks of “unenacted resolutions.”215  In Texas legislative practice, 
 
210 TEX. CONST. art. III, §§ 5(a), 24(b); see also TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 301.001 (West 2013). 
211 GREENBOOK 14th ed., supra note 1, at 118. 
212 Justice Greenhill urged that where there was only a Regular Session, the “R.S.” may be omitted.”  
Uniform Citations for Briefs, supra note 139, at 389. 
213 The phrase “called session” is derived from the reference to the Governor’s proclamation as the “call” 
of the session, in turn derived from the Texas Constitution’s reference to “the proclamation of the Governor 
calling [a special] session.”  TEX. CONST. art. III, § 40.  The phrase displaced that of “extra session” sometime 
between 1879 and 1884.  Compare, e.g., H.J. OF TEX., 16th Leg., 1st C.S., tit. pg. (1879), with H.J. OF TEX., 
18th Leg., 1st C.S., tit. pg. (1884). 
214 GREENBOOK 14th ed., supra note 1, at 67. 
215 The U.S. Constitution does not explicitly require that laws be enacted by bill.  For example, it requires 
that “[n]o Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by law . . . .”  
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a resolution is adopted, not enacted.216  This is because resolutions are not law in 
Texas; only bills may enact law.217  Thus, resolutions do not have an enacting 
clause.218  Similarly, because they are not law, resolutions cannot be “codified”; the 
Greenbook instructs that “if codified, a resolution should be cited as a statute”219 
simply makes no sense.  If the Greenbook is referring to amendments to the Texas 
Constitution proposed by joint resolutions, when amendments are approved by the 
voters, they become part of the constitution itself and should be cited under chapter 
nine, “Current Constitution.”  Finally, just as for a bill, there may be several versions 
of a resolution before it passes or fails; thus, Greenbook forms for resolutions suffer 
from many of the same defects as those discussed above for bills. 
3. Amendments 
 
Turning to amendments to measures, the Greenbook simply does not address 
them.  Amendments directly shape the final text and may take the bill beyond an 
original concept; they form part of the “better pedigree” of determining the meaning 
of the final text.220  The Texas amendment tree is straightforward; however, the 
sequencing of amendments under the tree must be noted to aid in understanding the 
proceedings.221  The key actions on amendments are whether a house adopts them or 
disposes of them through parliamentary means, i.e., a motion to table or a point of 
order.  There is a difference between the two methods.  Adoption of a motion to 
table222 an amendment is that house’s final and adverse disposition of that 
amendment, rather than a simple refusal to consider it at that time.223  If an amendment 
 
U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 7.  The Congress has made appropriations through joint resolution.  See, e.g., Act of 
Oct. 18, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-500, 100 Stat. 1783 (1986). 
216 See, e.g., TEX. H. RULE 9, § 1(c), TEX. H.R. 4, 86th Leg., R.S., 2019 H.J. OF TEX. 50, 132 (stating that 
“[a] joint resolution [proposing a constitutional amendment] shall be adopted on any reading after the first if it 
receives” the necessary supermajority and that “it shall fail of adoption[]” if it does not receive the necessary 
supermajority on its third reading); H.J. OF TEX., 1st Cong., R.S., 80 (1838) (recording that “a joint 
resolution . . . was called up and read a second time . . . Mr. White moved that the resolution be adopted; and 
the questions being taken thereon, was decided in the affirmative”). 
217 TEX. CONST. art. III, § 30 (“No law shall be passed, except by bill . . . .”); Mosheim v. Rollins, 79 
S.W.2d 672, 674–75 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935). 
218 Tex. H.R.J. Res. 4, 71st Leg., R.S., 1989 Gen. Laws 6424 (showing the resolving clause for a joint 
resolution proposing an amendment to Texas Constitution); Tex. H.R.J. Res. 6, 71st Leg., R.S., 1989 Tex. Gen. 
Laws 6424 (showing the resolving clause for a joint resolution ratifying the Twenty-Seventh Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution). 
219 GREENBOOK 14th ed., supra note 1, at 67.      
220 Nourse, Decision Theory, supra note 38, at 97.  As noted, adoption of an amendment deleting text in a 
bill is legislative evidence of the deleted language’s rejection.  Smith v. Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d 611, 616–17 (Tex. 
1980).  However, there is “no controlling significance to the Legislature’s failure to enact [a] proposed 
amendment.”  Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Summers, 282 S.W.3d 433, 443 (Tex. 2009) (quoting Tex. Emp’t 
Comm’n v. Holberg, 440 S.W.2d 38, 42 (Tex. 1969)). 
221 The Tech Redbook attempted to fill the gap, but the forms did not address the sequencing concern.  See 
TECH REDBOOK, supra note 187.      
222 The motion to table can be applied to any pending legislative business.  See TEX. H. RULE 7, § 12, TEX. 
H.R. 4, 86th Leg., R.S., 2019 H.J. OF TEX. 50, 118. 
223 E.g., id. (providing that an adopted motion to table “shall have the effect of killing the bill, resolution, 
amendment, or other immediate proposition to which it was applied[]”). 
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is tabled or not, that is a material fact that should be noted under any system of legal 
citation. 
A point of order does not represent a decision on the merits, but only a 
decision as to whether the amendment meets certain substantive and procedural 
requirements, including form, timely filing, calendar rules, and germaneness.  The 
question of germaneness is often a “theological” question,224 and it should be noted 
if the amendment was ruled out on those grounds to aid in better understanding of the 
proceedings, especially in any challenge under the Texas Constitution’s germaneness 
rule.  While the other provisions governing amendments are more technical, points of 
order dispositions should be noted to avoid imputing any judgment on the merits. 
 
4. Procedural History and Explanatory Notations 
 
The Greenbook does not prescribe procedural history or explanatory 
notations for legislation.  The Texas Senate’s three-fifths rule requires a supermajority 
to bring a bill to the floor under almost all circumstances.  Failure of a suspension 
vote is significant because it shows that the Senate effectively rejected the bill.  Thus, 
the notation “suspension of the regular order failed” should be inserted after the 
citation information for the bill: 
 
S.B. 342 (S. Comm. Rpt.) (78th Leg.), suspension of the regular 
order failed, 78 S.J. Reg. 964 (2003). 
 
Similarly, adoption of the motion to strike the enacting clause shows that 
the body affirmatively voted to kill the bill: 
 
H.J.R. 35 (H. Comm. Rpt.), enacting clause stricken, 79 H.J. Reg. 
1658, 1675-1676 (2005). 
 
As discussed above, amendments can be killed in one of a few ways: through 
a straight up or down vote on their adoption; by tabling them; or by a successful point 
of order that the amendment does not comply with all procedural rules.  The fact of 
any of these is material to understanding the action taken on the proposal.  Thus, we 
could have the following: 
 
H. Fl. Amend. No. 1 by Hartnett, et al., to C.S.S.B. 266 (H. Comm. 
Rpt.), withdrawn, 78 H. Jour. 3884 (May 25, 2003). 
 
H. Fl. Amend. No. 3 by Hill to H. Fl. Amend. No. 2 by Gallego to 
C.S.S.B. 266 (H. Comm. Rpt.), failed of adoption on record vote, 78 
H. Jour. 3885 (May 25, 2003). 
 
224 GEORGE D. BRADEN ET AL., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF TEXAS: AN ANNOTATED AND 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 162 (1977). 
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A special case is presented when dealing with the second chamber’s 
amendments to the engrossed text received from the first chamber.  If the engrossed 
text is a House bill, the Senate’s changes are termed “Senate amendments”; although 
stated in the plural, the set of amendment documents is considered a single, indivisible 
amendment for purpose of concurring or going to conference.225  This, too, must be 
properly indicated like so: 
 
S. Amends. to H.B. 2098 (Engr.), concurrence refused and 
conference requested, 85 H. Jour. 4879 (May 25, 2017). 
 
S. Amends to H.B. 1729 (Engr.), concurrence on record vote, 85 H. 
Jour. 3978 (May 20, 2017). 
 
The importance of procedural history when citing legislation is not isolated 
to Texas, and a couple of examples from other states show this.  In New York, the 
Senate majority leader may “star” a bill appearing on the calendar, which suspends 
all further action on its passage.226  Once affixed, only the majority leader may remove 
the designation, and action may resume not earlier than the day after its removal.227  
While starring may be used to buy time to address “technically defective” 
legislation,228 it is “[t]he most absolute, undemocratic procedure that can possibly 
exist” because it also permits a majority leader to delay or kill legislation that is likely 
supported by a chamber majority.229  Just as with a failure to suspend the rules in 
Texas, starring is a significant practice because it represents an adverse action on a 
bill that should be reflected in the bill’s citation information: 
 
(2020 NY Senate Bill S9566, starred, S. Calen. for May 30, 2020, 
unstarred, S. Calen. for Aug. 2, 2020). 
 
In Massachusetts, a single member may block consideration of bills 
considered during “informal sessions” held to circumvent session-ending deadlines 
and during which unanimous consent is required to pass any legislation.230  Again, 
this is an adverse action that is necessary to understand enactment history, especially 
 
225 E.g., Rules of the House of Representatives, in TEX. LEGISLATIVE MANUAL: 56th Leg., R.S., 355 
(1959). 
226 JEREMY M. CREELAN & LAURA M. MOULTON, THE NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: AN 
EVALUATION AND BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM 21–22 (2004). 
227 Id. at 22; JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF NEW YORK STATE 108, 110 (2d 
ed. 2008). 
228 One study found that roughly one-half of the stars were requested by bill sponsors.  John J. Pitney, Jr., 
Leaders and Rules in the New York State Senate, 7 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 491, 495 (1982). 
229 CREELAN & MOULTON, supra note 226, at 22. 
230 Steven T. James, Government by Consensus—Restrictions on Formal Business in the Massachusetts 
Legislature Inspire Innovative Ways to Govern, 13 J. AM. SOC’Y LEGIS. CLERKS & SEC’YS 69, 74 (2007). 
  
 Journal of Legislation                  70 
 
if any argument is later made that the legislature “rejected” an attempt to clarify an 
existing statute: 
 
2020 H. 3400, unanimous consent refused in informal session, 2020 
H. Jour. 1160 (Nov. 30, 2020). 
 
III.  THE WAY FORWARD: CITATION MANUALS FOR LEGISLATION  
 
Because of the case law-centered view of legal practice, forms for legislative 
materials are largely unsettled, which provides room for substantial improvements 
untethered from the Bluebook.231  Returning to Texas, I would propose an 
Orangebook232 to serve as that state’s manual of legal citation for legislation.  It would 
analyze the jurisdiction-specific ways in which the Texas legislative process operates 
to shape the Legislature’s final decision and specify the significant information 
lawyers and judges need when pointing to the relevant legislative evidence in context 
needed to explain those decisions to each other.  It would address the unique methods 
used by the Texas Legislature that differ from Congress and note why those unique 
methods matter in understanding what happened during the enactment process.  In 
the familiar context of a citation manual, an Orangebook will enable expert reasoning 
from legislation by common-law lawyers. 
For Texas legislation, then, the Orangebook will provide Texas lawyers with 
a straightforward citation system that aids expert legal thought concerning legislation 
and reflects the peculiarities of the state’s unique lawmaking process.  Taking a less-
prescriptive approach to legislative citation is inadequate.  There simply is too much 
information that needs to be provided to leave it to chance, and lawyers and judges 
 
231 See Bryan A. Garner, An Uninformed System of Citation: The Maroonbook Blues, 1 SCRIBES J. LEGAL 
WRITING 192, 192 (1990) (urging adherence to settled citation forms).  Non-lawyers participating in the 
legislative process lack the same attachment to legal citation practice yet also need a workable method of citing 
legislation, for which non-legal systems are also unsatisfactory.  E.g., Legal Documents, in KAREN PATRIAS, 
CITING MEDICINE: THE NLM STYLE GUIDE FOR AUTHORS, EDITORS, AND PUBLISHERS (Daniel L. Wendling 
ed., 2d ed. 2009)      (making “no attempt . . . to force references to legal materials such as public laws and 
hearings into a [non-legal] format”).  The Orangebook permits non-lawyers to engage with lawyers and judges 
on equal terms. 
232 Now seems the best time as any to claim this color for a citation manual.  This complements its use by 
the Food and Drug Administration’s use of the term to describe its directory of approved drugs and uses—
somewhat ironic seems apt, given the anxiety over citation.  See Orange Book: Approved Drug Products with 
Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://perma.cc/VZN9-VKCM (last visited 
April 24, 2018).  The London County Council’s 1893 report on assessments according to benefits was 
colloquially referred to as the Orange Book.  See EDWIN R.A. SELIGMAN, ESSAYS IN TAXATION 343 n.1, 349 
n.1 (1895).  Pepperdine University School of Law issues an Orange Book, an orientation guide for first-year law 
students, the color being one of two university colors, the other blue.  PEPPERDINE UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, THE 
ORANGE BOOK 2014 (2017), https://perma.cc/TK78-L76L; University Colors, PEPPERDINE UNIV., 
https://perma.cc/8RCS-WKWD (last visited Apr. 24, 2018).  None of these uses conflict with the use of the term 
here. 
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do not yet have enough experience reading legislation in light of legislative 
procedure.233 
In Appendix A, I set out the topics that would be addressed by the 
Orangebook.  In Appendix B, I set out the text of a proposed citation rule for bills 
that is a comprehensive approach to the problems presented in Part 2.B, and the 
appended rule explains the rationales for the suggested citation forms.  The 
Orangebook would “correct[] most of the [Greenbook’s] faults that I have discussed 
in this [Article] and[, I hope,] introduce[] no new ones.”234  It would ensure that the 
“the reader [is given all] valuable information”235 to expertly reason about the 
products of the legislative process.  And, as we have seen, the Bluebook and 
Greenbook have ceded this area in favor of their common-law regimes; just as the 
Greenbook displaced the Bluebook in the citation of Texas case law, it is expected 
that the Orangebook would do the same to the Greenbook for Texas legislation.  And 
it achieves two important goals. 
At a minimum, the Orangebook should aid in improving lawyers’ thinking 
about legislation by according these materials the same care and consideration 
accorded to case law regardless of interpretative theory.  It faithfully expresses the 
types of authorities and process-dependent reasoning used by lawyers practicing in 
the legislative branch.  These improvements also recognize that legislative materials 
are legal authorities, equal to cases, to be used in legal reasoning.  It provides “a 
reliable system of citing” legislation to permit its “attentive and meticulous 
deployment” in legal argument about the legislature’s decision embodied in the final 
text of its statutes and resolutions.236  The Orangebook will greatly enhance the ability 
of lawyers and judges to “understand the nuances of [legislation;] to cite it correctly 
and thoughtfully” and to do so in a “readily available, comprehensible form”237 that 
mirrors the forms used for cases and common-law authorities.  This further aids the 
Orangebook’s acceptance by lawyers and judges because it relies on the familiar 
patterns of legal reasoning embodied in traditional legal citation.238 
More importantly, the Orangebook permits lawyers and judges to implement 
Nourse’s legislative decision theory when interpreting statutes.  As we saw in Part II, 
using legislative decision theory to interpret statutes avoids the counter-majoritarian 
problems of current statutory interpretation theories that “allow those who lost the 
fight in Congress to win in the courts.”239  However, as we saw in reviewing Jones 
and Fleming Foods, the theory cannot be properly implemented until legal citation 
permits lawyers and judges to locate, identify, understand, and explain the sources 
and nature of the group-authorized legislative evidence that provides the necessary 
context to understand what the legislature did in enacting a statute.  The Orangebook 
 
233 See Garner, supra note 231, at 194–95 (describing the problems with “frequent grants of discretion” in 
legal citation as expressed in the University of Chicago Law Review’s Maroonbook). 
234 See Richard A. Posner, Goodbye to the Bluebook, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1343, 1351–52 (1986). 
235 See id. at 1352. 
236 See Shapiro & Krishnaswami, supra note 126, at 1575. 
237 See Franklin, supra note 22, at 132. 
238 See supra Part I.C. 
239 NOURSE, MISREADING LAW, supra note 21, at 34–63. 
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permits expert reverse engineering of the statute to determine all relevant evidence of 
how the majority, at each stage of enactment, shaped the final text that both houses 
passed and presented to the executive.  In short, use of the Orangebook should prevent 
recurring, substantial errors in statutory interpretation like those we saw in Jones and 





Errors in statutory interpretation are directly attributable to legal citation’s 
failure to adequately provide for understanding or expressing the legislative 
procedures adopted to guide the legislature’s decisions in enacting statutes.  Providing 
a comprehensive method of citation for legislative materials that accounts correctly 
for legislation and the procedural context of its development aids better statutory 
interpretation that is faithful to those group decisions.  Better legal citation of 
legislation helps a legal reader evaluate the actions required or taken at each stage of 
the legislative process to determine what the legislature decided by providing citation 
forms to permit lawyers to intelligently and fluently discuss the legislative process 
when interpreting statutes. 
While the Orangebook citation manual sketched in this Article is specific to 
Texas, it sets an example for other regional jurisdictions to develop sophisticated rules 
of legal citation expressing their particular lawmaking processes—and even for the 
Bluebook to do the same for the Congress.  The Orangebook—and others like it—








240 See Schauer, Authority and Authorities, schauer note 25, at 1960–61. 
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 APPENDIX A: TOPIC OUTLINE FOR LEGISLATIVE CITATION MANUALS  
 
I. Constitutions 
 A. Constitutional Provisions Currently in Force 
 B. Constitutional Provisions Approved But Not Yet Effective 
 C. Constitutional Provisions No Longer in Force 
 D. Constitutional Convention Ordinances 
II. Statutes 
 A. Codified Statutes 
 B. Uncodified Statutes 
 C. Statutory Compilations 
 D. Enacted Appropriations Bills 
III. Session Laws 
 A. Session Laws, Generally 
 B. Session Laws, Special Cases 
IV. Bills 
 A. Bills, Generally 
 B. Bills, Appropriations 
 C. Bills, Committee Amendments 
 D. Bills, Floor Amendments 
 E. Bills, Amendments Between the Two Houses 
V. Joint Resolutions 
 A. Joint Resolutions, Generally 
VI. Concurrent and Simple Resolutions 
 A. Concurrent Resolutions 
 B. Simple Resolutions 
VII. Legislative Journals, Debates, and Remarks 
 A. Journals, Generally 
 B. Journals, Remarks and Debate 
 C. Other Debates and Remarks, House 
 D. Other Debates and Remarks, Senate 
 E. Third-Party Transcripts 
VIII. Legislative Rules  
 A. Rules of Procedure 
 B. Internal Rules 
 C. Calendar Rules 
 D. Legislative Precedents 
 E. Secondary Authorities 
 F. Explanatory Notes and Comments 
IX. Calendars and Lists of Business 
 A. House Calendars and Lists of Items Eligible for Consideration 
 B. Senate Regular Order of Business and Senate Agenda 
X. Legislative Documents 
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 A. Analyses of Legislation 
 B. Bill File 
 C. Fiscal Notes 
 D. Impact Statements 
 E. Revisor’s Reports 
XI. Committee Proceedings 
 A. Committee Minutes and Meeting Notices 
 B. Committee Hearings and Testimony 
XII. Texas Legislature Online 
XIII. Executive Material: The Governor 
 A. Veto Messages 
 B. Other Messages to the Legislature 
 C. Signature Statements 
 D. Executive Orders 
 E. Proclamations 
 F. Other Materials 
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 APPENDIX B: SAMPLE CITATION RULE FOR BILLS  
 
Rule 7. BILLS AND AMENDMENTS 
 
Rule 7.1 Bills, Generally 
  Greenbook Rule 14.1.1 
The standard citation to a bill includes the type of bill, the bill number, the 
bill version, a pinpoint reference (if any), the legislature number, session type (if 
necessary), and the date of the document.  House bills are designated “H.B.” and 
Senate bills are designated “S.B.”  You do not need to designate regular sessions as 
the Legislature is constitutionally required to hold a biennial regular session.  For 
example: 
 
H.B. 525 (Filed) at 1 [or § 1], 79th Legis. (Jan. 24, 2005). 
 
There are many versions of a bill as it makes its way through the legislative 
process, and the appropriate version must be indicated unless the citation context 
otherwise makes the bill version clear.  Those exceptions are noted under the 
appropriate citation rule.  The major bill versions are: 
Filed  The version of the bill as filed and introduced in its 
chamber of origin. 
 
H. or S. 
Comm. Rpt. 
The version of the bill as reported from a committee in 
either chamber.  If the version is a committee substitute, 
indicate that separately as noted below. 
 
Engr. The version of the bill as approved after the major 




The version of the bill proposed by a conference 
committee after different versions of the bill were 
approved by each chamber. 
 
Enr.  The version of the bill as finally approved in identical 
text by each chamber. 
 
Under House and Senate rules, a committee may report a complete substitute 
in lieu of the referred bill and the committee substitute then becomes the text 
considered on second reading.  Because a committee in either chamber may report a 
substitute for a bill from the other chamber, note both the fact of the substitution and 
the chamber in which it occurred.  Cite a committee substitute as follows: 
 
C.S.H.B. 274 (H. Comm. Rpt.) § 1, 85th Legis. (Apr. 17, 2017). 
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Committee reports are required to be printed and distributed to the full 
chamber.  At times, a chamber may order that a committee report on a non-
controversial bill, such as a non-substantive statutory codification, not be printed.  
Note when a chamber orders a bill not printed: 
 
C.S.H.B. 274 (H. Comm. Rpt.) § 1, 85th Legis. (Apr. 17, 2017) (ordered not 
printed). 
 
If a bill has a short title, you may begin the citation with it.  Do not confuse 
the short title of a bill with either the bill’s caption describing its subject (i.e., “relating 
to the minimum wage”) or the bill’s assignment of a short title to a proposed portion 
of a code or statue (i.e., the bill designates a proposed new chapter of the Occupations 
Code as the Full Employment Act).  For example: 
Minimum Wage Amendments of 1997, H.B. 334 (Filed) § 2, 75th Legis. (Dec. 
12, 1996). 
If the bill designates a new proposed portion of a code or statute with a short 
title, you may indicate that parenthetically: 
 
S.B. 1193 (H. Comm. Rpt.) § 1, 84th Legis. (May 10, 2017) 
(proposing the Texas Revised Uniform Fiduciary Access to 
Digital Assets Act as ch. 2001, Estates Code). 
 
If citing to line numbers in a bill, rather than to sections, use a semicolon to 
separate the line number from the page number: 
 
H.B. 525 (Filed) at 1:28, 79th Legis. (Jan. 24, 2005). 
 
Enacted bills are cited as statutes under Rule 5 or as session laws under Rule 
6.  An exception is when discussing the legislative history and it is necessary to cite 
the enrolled bill; for example, when the bill has not yet been approved or vetoed by 
the Governor: 
 
H.B. 525 (Enr.) at 5, 79th Legis. (May 20, 2005). 
 
If a bill is vetoed, note that fact as subsequent history: 
 
H.B. 2153 (Enr.), vetoed, 66 H. Jour. 3272-3273 (1979). 
H.B. 32 (Enr.), vetoed, 28 Tex. Reg. 5691 (July 25, 2003). 
H.B. 1776 (Enr.), vetoed, Gov. Ann W. Richards, Veto Message, 72d 
Legis. (June 3, 1993). 
 
If the veto is overridden, indicate that fact as subsequent history: 
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H.B. 2153 (Enr.), veto overridden, 66 H. Jour. 3276 and 66 S. Jour. 
1431 (1979). 
 
A bill’s subsequent history must be indicated for certain negative actions that 





The motion to strike the enacting clause was adopted, which 






Further consideration of the bill was precluded by a successful 
point of order.  Unless describing the legislative history or the 
doctrinal contours of a legislative rule, it is not necessary to note 
points of order that were not sustained.  A parenthetical noting 
the section of the rules under which the point of order was 
brought is useful. 
reconsidered
  
The motion to reconsider a vote by which the bill was passed to 
engrossment or finally passed.  Indicate the vote that was 
reconsidered.  Unless essential to describing the legislative 





The Senate refused to consider the bill.  The motion to suspend 
the regular order may be renewed; if passed at a later time, there 
is no need to include the prior rejection unless describing the 
legislative history or the doctrinal contours of a legislative rule. 
 
Rule 7.2 Bills, Appropriations 
  No Greenbook Rule 
Unenacted appropriations bills may include a citation to specific 
appropriations or riders as under Rule 5.4: 
 
Item B.1.1 (Plant Health & Seed Quality, Agric. Dept.), S.B. 1 
(Engr.) at VI-2, 79th Legis. (Mar. 23, 2005). 
 
Rider 21 (Tex. Wine Mktg. Assistance Program, Agric. Dept.), S.B. 
1 (Conf. Comm. Rpt.) at VI-6, 79th Legis. (May 28, 2005). 
 
Rule 7.3 Bills, Committee Amendments 
  No Greenbook Rule 
For minor technical and clarifying amendments to referred bills, committees 
may recommend discrete amendments instead of reporting a complete committee 
substitute.  Any committee amendment must be offered by an individual member on 
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the floor before it may be considered.  Cite committee amendments if discussing a 
bill before its second reading consideration or if discussing unoffered amendments. 
 
S. Jud. Comm. Amend. No. 1 to H.B. 930 (S. Comm. Rpt.) at 1, 80th Legis. 
(May 7, 2007). 
 
Rule 7.4 Bills, Floor Amendments 
  No Greenbook Rule 
Floor amendments may be offered to a bill on its second or third readings.  
Amendments are classed according to the order in which they are offered; up to three 
types of amendments may be pending at any one time: an amendment, an amendment 
to the amendment, and a substitute for the amendment to the amendment.  The 
appropriate class must be indicated, and its procedural posture should be indicated if 
needed for clarification.  The text of each amendment is printed in, and must be cited 
to, the journal; omit the session designation as that information is conveyed by the 
journal citation.  You should indicate the procedural posture of the amendment as 
appropriate. 
 
H. Fl. Amend. No. 3 by Hill to H. Fl. Amend. No. 2 by Gallego to 
C.S.S.B. 266 (H. Comm. Rpt.), motion to table failed on record vote, 
78 H. Jour. 3885 (May 25, 2003). 
 
H. Fl. Amend. No. 3 by Hill to H. Fl. Amend. No. 2 by Gallego to 
C.S.S.B. 266 (H. Comm. Rpt.), failed of adoption on record vote, 78 
H. Jour. 3886 (May 25, 2003). 
 
H. Fl. Amend. No. 2 by Gallego to C.S.S.B. 266 (H. Comm. Rpt.), 
adopted [on record vote], 78 H. Jour. 3886 (May 25, 2003). 
 
H. Fl. Amend. No. 2 by Morrison to S.B. 4 (3d Rdg.), adopted, 78 
H. Jour. 4079 (May 26, 2003). 
 
A main amendment may take the form of a complete substitute for the bill, 
in which all text after the enacting clause is stricken and replaced. That fact must be 
indicated: 
 
H. Fl. Amend. No. 1 by Wolens to C.S.H.J.R. 31 (H. Comm. Rpt), 
75 H. Jour. 2172-2177 (May 9, 1997) (complete floor substitute). 
 
Once an amendment has been amended, indicate that fact in all subsequent 
discussions of that amendment: 
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S. Fl. Amend. No. 1 by Sibley (as amended) to C.S.S.B. 1558 (S. 
Comm. Rpt.), adopted on record vote, 77 S. Jour. 1829 (May 8, 
2001). 
 
Procedural postures are indicated by the following phrases: 
 




The amendment affirmatively rejected by the chamber. 
 
point of order 
sustained 
against  
Further consideration of the amendment was precluded 
by a successful point of order. Unless describing the 
legislative history or the doctrinal contours of a 
legislative rule, it is not necessary to note points of order 
that were not sustained. A parenthetical noting the 
section of the rules under which the point of order was 




The motion to reconsider a vote on prior action on the 
amendment was adopted.  Unless essential to describing 
the legislative history, it is not necessary to note failures 
to reconsider. 
 
tabled The amendment was tabled. 
 
motion to table 
failed 
The amendment was not tabled. 
 
withdrawn The amendment was withdrawn, ordinarily because of 
the threat of a point of order or to cure substantive 
disagreement. 
 
For any action on which a recorded vote was taken, add “on record vote” 
after the procedural phrase. 
 
Rule 7.5 Bills, Amendments Between the Two Houses 
  No Greenbook Rule 
One house of the Legislature cannot directly amend a bill originating in the 
other, but instead adopts one or more separate amendments indicating the adopting 
house’s preferred text.  For example, an engrossed House bill is sent to the Senate and 
referred to a Senate committee.  That committee reports a complete committee 
substitute, which is then amended one or more times on the Senate floor.  Before final 
passage in the Senate, cite amendments under Rule 7.3-7.4. Example: 
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S. Fl. Amend. No. 1 by Estes to C.S.H.B. 2533 (S. Comm. 
Rpt.), adopted, 85 S. Jour. 2458 (May 22, 2017). 
 
The engrossed bill is not altered to incorporate the text of these amendments, 
but is returned after final passage to the originating house with the adopting house’s 
amendments separately attached.  The originating house may concur in those 
amendments, and replace the text of the its bill, or refuse to concur and request a 
conference.  Regardless of the number or type of the adopting house’s amendments, 
they are considered as a single, indivisible document related to the engrossed bill after 
final passage in the second house.  Example: 
 
S. Amends. to H.B. 2533 (Engr.) at 1, 85th Legis. (May 22, 2017). 
 
 
 
 
 
